

JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES, INFLUENCE AND THE OPERATIONS OF ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCIES IN NIGERIA

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Abstract

The study examined the jurisdictional issues and influence of the operations of anti-corruption agencies [Nigeria Police Force (NPF), Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and Economic Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)] with a view to identifying the challenges and opportunities in their interactions. Structural-Functional and Public Choice Theories were adopted as theoretical framework while qualitative research design was utilized. Primary and secondary sources of data were employed. The primary data were obtained through Key Informant Interviews (KIIs). Eighteen (18) KIIs were conducted purposively with selected officials of the NPF, ICPC and EFCC. Secondary sources of data included the use of textbooks, journals, Acts of the agencies, etc. Data were analyzed using thematic content analyses. Findings revealed that although the interaction of these agencies caused local frictions, but were influenced through collaboration, threshold and coordination mechanisms for intelligence gathering in combating corruption. The study concluded that jurisdictional issues between the NPF and the specialized agencies have had mixed consequences. While conflicts between the NPF and the specialized agencies have occurred, there have also been synergy in their operations. The paper recommended that the agencies should streamline their operations and embrace consensus driven anti-corruption policies and practices in Nigeria.

Keywords: *Jurisdictional Issues, Police, Anti-corruption Agencies, Corruption, Influence*

Introduction

The primary role of Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACAs) is to combat corruption in a state based on their jurisdictions. Jurisdictions here imply that each of the ACAs is accorded the responsibilities for combating corruption and financial related crimes for the actualization of some set of anti-corruption's objectives in a given country. ACAs that combat corruption include the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), the Code of Conduct Tribunal (CCT), the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), and Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Apart from NPF, the other agencies are specialized, established from the existing departments and sections of the NPF.

Consequently, the NPF is an essential agency in combating crimes and corruption. Yet, the NPF has been generally perceived to be the corrupt agencies of government (Karn, 2013; Inyang and Abraham, 2014; Awopeju, 2018; Awopeju, 2021). Given this, NPF is confronted with the problem of combating financial crimes and other related offences. Of all the agencies involved in combating corruption, NPF serves as a conventional institution with enabling power to combat corruption in the country. It has a Special Fraud Unit (SFU); which fights corruption and provides assistance in reviewing situations where potential fraud has been identified in the society.

In the early colonial times, the police were an octopus discharging all of the functions of the currently existing specialized agencies. Creating the specialized agencies serves as a reform of the NPF. The reform of the NPF to create other distinct agencies was one of the several issues that engaged the attention of the founding patriots during the constitutional conference that led to independence. At independence, the NPF was the anchor point to all security policies (Ahmed, 2007) and anti-corruption.

The ICPC and the EFCC stand out as valuable agencies from this reform. The ICPC has the mandate to investigate bribery and other related offences while the EFCC investigates financial and economic related crimes. The ICPC and the EFCC have been given policing powers such as investigation, enforcement of financial crimes, prevention of corruption, summoning and conducting prosecution of corruption cases in Nigeria. In other words, the core powers of the NPF have been shared by the ACAs in combating corruption in Nigeria. These core powers/areas of interaction cause friction between the NPF and the specialized anti-corruption agencies as these agencies fulfill police duties of investigation, summons, arrest, detention and, prosecution. A plethora of studies have established that there are jurisdictional conflicts and that powers of the ACAs do overlap which cause confusion, domination and competition among the agencies involved in combating corruption (Ngbawke, 2009; Waziri, 2011; Awopeju, 2023). In view of this, extant studies such as Enweremadu (2012), Awopeju (2022), Awopeju (2023), Okereke and Okoli (2023) have

investigated the operational challenges as well as consequences that emerge from the inter-agency's relations of the ACAs in Nigeria. However, the jurisdictional partitioning issues arising from their relations and how these have influenced their operations have received little scholarly attention. This paper is significant because it will contribute to efforts aimed at correcting and improving inter-agency relations between and among agencies understudy with the thought of combating financially related crimes and corruption in Nigeria. The specialized anti-corruption agencies offer interesting research possibilities because they are still in an active stage of transition and development. The process of change is important for the study of the administration of justice in the Nigerian state as the ability to document the changing and developing concepts of anti-corruption institutions in Nigeria would therefore be of inestimable value. In view of this, questions that arise from this study are: What has been the influence of the operations of these anti-corruption agencies due to jurisdictional issues arising from their inter-agency relations? Are there opportunities in the operations of ACAs despite the jurisdictional issues in Nigeria? In order to address these questions, this paper is structured into six major parts. Part one introduces the study, part two deals with conceptual clarification, part three presents theoretical framework, part four deals with the methodology, part five examines jurisdictional issues, influence and the operations of anti-corruption agencies in Nigeria, while part six concludes and makes policy recommendations.

Conceptual Clarification

Jurisdictional Partitioning Issue

This means anti-corruption conflict of interest/a conflict between or among anti-corruption institutions as to the exercise of jurisdiction power, right, or authority over anti-corruption regimes/frameworks while combating corruption.

Jurisdictional Influence

Jurisdictional influence is the capacity to have effect or change the actions, consequences, control, domination of the anti-corruption institutions in the anti-corruption operations

Anti-corruption Agencies

In the words of De Sousa (2006), ACAs are resilient organizations that are funded by the public with the aim of combating corruption as well as other related crimes by reducing its occurrence through aggressive means. Similarly, Afolabi (2019) defines ACAs as the institutions created by governments with the force of law to arrest and prosecute persons and investigate institutions, private or public, that engage in corrupt practices. For the purpose of this paper, the latter definition is the working definition.

Theoretical Framework

The study adopted a combination of structural functionalism and public choice theory as the theoretical framework. The structural-functional approach was adapted to Political Science through Sociology by Talcott Parsons, Robert Merto and Marion Levy; Gabriel Almond and James Coleman developed it as a tool of political analysis in Comparative Politics (Almond and Coleman, 1960). The basis of structural-functional approach is that a political system performs a certain set of functions in order to ensure its continuation. The approach addresses the necessary functions, what institutions fulfill them and under what conditions they accomplish such in any given political system. The functions include political socialization, political recruitment, interest articulation and aggregation and political communication (Almond and Coleman, 1960). These identified functions are actions and behaviors that are supposed to be performed on a regular basis for system preservation and advancement. According to Merton (1968), functions are those observed outcomes which make for the adaptation or adjustment of given system while dysfunction refers to an action or actions that is/are detrimental to the existence and growth of the system. Structural-functional approach is relevant to the present study because of the focus on the agencies (Police, ICPC, EFCC), the jurisdictional powers/functions they exercise, and the influence vis-à-vis their operations. These agencies, through their powers, combat corruption in Nigeria. Talcott Parson (1997) contributed to this study by identifying four functions in the structural-functional approach, (i) goal attainment (ii) integration (iii) adaptation and (iv) pattern maintenance. Under goal attainment, every agency of government is expected to perform a role in ensuring that the system keeps functioning. Integration is a kind of linkage or cooperation among the agencies of government; adaption refers to adaption to the system in operation, the ability to act in line with the stipulated rule and becoming an integral part of functions to the extent that, as agencies perform their functions, they understand their operations, and pattern maintenance refers to the action and behavior carried out regularly by these agencies so as to maintain the advancement of the system.

While this approach is valuable in analyzing political life, the structural-functional approach has drawbacks, including conservatism, meaning that the status quo should always remain, which makes one repeat some process or functions overtime. This might well become be monotonous, tiresome and discouraging over time. It has also been said that the approach is a one-way operation, which does not give consideration to procedures. The realization of these shortcomings necessitated the combination of the theory with public choice theory in this study.

The public choice theory was developed by Geoffrey Brenman and James Buchanan in 1985. They posited that societal rules are significant in that they control or restrain human and organizational behavior (Brenman and Buchanan, 1985). The theory regards corruption as an opportune means designed with the aim of receiving benefits belonging to individuals or groups to the detriment of

the society. The theory argues that the scope and gravity of corruption in a country is determined by the institutional set up, and not necessarily by the character of its civil servants and politicians.

According to public choice theorists, it is within the context of the existing rules that bureaucrats' behavior and the entrepreneurs giving a bribe should be questioned. Therefore, it is important to have a perfect knowledge of the laws and institutions of a country so as to understand and perfectly analyze corruption in the societal context. If this is not achieved, efforts towards combating corruption will be in futile. An established organization or society that does not understand the significance of obtainable rules will definitely be ineffective in its operations, because rules and regulations are meant to control individuals' relationships with one another, specify the mode of conflict resolution, and cast constraints on individuals' behavior as well as that of the group. Real rules are supposed to guide individuals to cultivate habits that allow them to embark on personal desires or activities without infringing on others as they do the same.

In the same vein, the control of corruption can only be properly handled through legal reforms. Opportunism is seen as an exhibited behavior intended to improve personal welfare to the detriment of other citizens, which may include activities such as shrinking, corruption, unfavorable selection, hazardous behavior and free riding (Ostrom et. al, 1993; Mbaku, 1997). Public Choice Theory considers the challenges of constitutional maintenance to be part of the control of corruption and other forms of opportunism. Hope & Chikulo (1999) posit that a post constitutional society would continue to battle with opportunism when the given rules are still effective. Therefore, effective enforcement of rules in order to ensure cooperation is instrumental in controlling opportunism in the post-contractual society.

The theory is applicable to this study because the anti-corruption laws that guide the EFCC and the ICPC reveal how effective these institutions are in combating financial crimes and corruption and regulating people's behaviors. These institutions have jurisdiction through the rules and laws they exercise. The theory sets a priority for the institutions, through legal means, to discourage active and political participation in corruption.

Methodology


The paper employed qualitative research methodology, using both primary and secondary sources of data collection. The method for primary data was sought through Key Informant Interviews (KIIs). A total of eighteen (18) KIIs were conducted purposively with the officials of the policing and anti-corruption agencies, ICPC (5), EFCC (5), Police (6) and scholars (2). Secondary data were also derived from Acts of the agencies, the documents regarding Inter-Agency Task Team (IATT), Open Society Initiatives for West Africa (OSIWA), newspapers, textbook, and journal articles. Data were analyzed using thematic

content analyses. Ethical consideration such as the notion of voluntary participation, informed consent, confidentiality and anonymity were adhered to in the conduct of the study.

Jurisdictional Issues, Influence and the Operations of Anti-Corruption Agencies in Nigeria

The NPF has a primary role of maintaining law and order in the society. By virtue of their obligations, there is hardly a stratum of the society that can do without NPF. Indeed, NPF is the most visible law enforcement agent on the streets because of their unavoidable task of combating crimes and ensuring the internal security of the country. Besides, the NPF is responsible for the conventional fight against corruption and therefore, specialized agencies, such as EFCC and ICPC, exercise police powers in combating corruption, resulting in a relationship between the NPF and these agencies. The importance of the NPF in the activities of other agencies involved in combating corruption and financial related crimes is illustrated below.

Figure 1 shows the relationship between the Nigeria Police Force and other law enforcement agencies (Specialized anti-corruption agencies) in Nigeria



Source: The Author

The above diagram shows that the NPF is the gatekeeper in other law enforcement agencies because it “appears to be a necessary gatekeeper in the system forge of criminal justice administration. The NPF was described as the gatekeeper of the system” (Okaro, cited in Arase & Iwufor, 2007, p.109). Despite being the gatekeeper of other law enforcement agencies, the anti-corruption institutions have the jurisdictions in which they exercise their

powers. The scope of the ACAs in this context, covers the NPF, ICPC and the EFCC.

In the course of exercising their policing duties, overlapping function occurs which has brought about conflict in the context of combating financial crimes and corruption. The Police Act empowers the NPF to enforce all laws (Section 4, Police Act, 1990). Furthermore, the Criminal and Penal Codes do not prevent the NPF from handling corruption cases in Nigeria. For instance, Section 53 of the Criminal Procedure Act gives the NPF the power to prevent and interpose into the commission of any offence. In addition, Section 51 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act also empowers the NPF to intervene for the sake of preventing, to its best of its ability, the commission of any offence (Section 51, ACJA, 2015). In other words, the NPF is the chief enforcer of all laws. However, the significant issue in their policing interactions is that the sacrosanct policing powers have not been taken away from the NPF (Awopeju, 2023). Besides, there is competition among the agencies. The Director, Investigation of the ICPC, Abuja, stressed that there is competition among the agencies involved in combating corruption. He said:

If you want to look at how the agencies have come out of the police, we would say it is a cat and mouse relationship...there could be challenges because within the law enforcement agencies, even in the advanced world, there is always traditional competition for the tough. This is the area of jurisdiction. This is where your power starts and where your power ends. So, the competition is always there...there is no way how the new agencies that have always derived their powers from the police that have been in existence and would not have a kind of competition of who is superior, who should take charge of this kind of crime or the other (KII/M/ICPC Official/Abuja/2018).

Then how are these agencies influenced in their operations while combating corruption in Nigeria? The ICPC officials who participated in the KIIs observed that there is synergy in the jurisdictional operations among the agencies. The Head, Prosecution Department, ICPC Abuja, said:

There is a synergy. There some cases that come to us. We look at the cases and if they are out of our jurisdiction, we will forward them to the EFCC. That is under our Act...and there are some cases they

get too and they will forward to us. There is no conflict of interest, we know our powers (KII/M/ICPC Official/Abuja/2018).

To further corroborate that there is synergy among the agencies, he spoke about how the issue of corruption is covered by the Criminal and Penal Codes:

The NPF can prosecute if the matter is brought to the Police; we cannot investigate. Our functions do overlap whether we like it or not but there is synergy as well too. We have had cases we fight, the EFCC fights. We would now say, withdraw one of the cases; [let's do a] joint prosecution. There is one we are doing right now, the Jonah Jang case. The EFCC and the ICPC are prosecuting together. Therefore, our functions overlap but there is always a synergy.

In order to resolve the conflict or competition issue among the agencies, he further submits:

In order to resolve the competition problem among agencies, the top echelon of those agencies always comes and tries to streamline the areas of jurisdictional responsibilities. There is a point [where] they see the need not to compete negatively among themselves, and they see the need to collaborate in [the] form of joint training, joint operation and other forms of collaboration as well (KII/M/ICPC Official/Abuja, 2018).

The Head, Investigation Department gave an instance when the NPF challenged their authority in combating corruption to show that competition exists between the NPF and the ICPC. He revealed:

We have even had instances whereby the NPF had to challenge our authority in some cases. They wanted to stop our people from carrying out operations. Overtime, we worked on it and the collaboration has been smooth to the point that even if we have gone on investigating, we have felt it necessary to

inform the Police Commissioner or any other senior police officer in the area that we are on ground. We do same the thing with the DSS to let them know we are on ground and that they even, as they often do, give protection and backing to our officers. So, from initial apprehension of lack of trust, we have progressed to the point of cooperation for better resolution of crimes in the society (KII/M/ICPC Official/Abuja, 2018).

He later admitted and emphasized that the conflict among the agencies is such that they are doing the same thing. He said:

Well, on the conflict, in the sense that we find ourselves, we more or less still do the same thing. That is conflict. It is not the conflict that is preventing each of the agencies that derive their powers from the police not to function. What we recognized is that NPF has decided to limit their operation to “street crimes.” If we say there is conflict, it is better to say it is not the conflict that is negative; we can say it is [an] enriching rivalry that more or less projects a kind of collaboration among the law enforcement agencies in Nigeria (KII/M/ICPC Official/Abuja, 2018).

To further substantiate that the agencies work in collaboration with one another, the Head, Public Affairs Department of the EFCC and the Head, Economic Governance affirmed it. The Head, Public Affairs confirmed that when he asserted:

We work in collaboration rather than clashing with each other. NPF at times, arrests cybercrime suspects and they bring them to us. If we are a jack of all trade, it becomes [a] problem for you. Everybody knows that we have the capacity in that area. In terms of training, skills, experience and expertise, the EFCC is better equipped to handle those generic of crimes [economic and financial crimes]. So, there is no basis of frictions. At times, the agencies bring cases to us that do

not fall under their mandates (KII/M/EFCC Official/Ibadan/2019).

Also, the Head, Economic Governance further stated that:

The drafter of the law, in their wisdom, incorporates that aspect so that issue of disagreement will not arise...and that these agencies that focus on the same goal. Even though there might be inter-agency rivalry, it has not been a hinderance to the anti-corruption campaign because we have worked closely with one another. Even, in the EFCC training, the EFCC has trained the NPF; the EFCC has trained the ICPC officials, officers from Civil Defense and Customs. In NPF training, the EFCC officials attend and, when ICPC conducts training, they invite nomination from the EFCC. So, this synergy ensures that friction is eliminated in anti-corruption campaign (KII/M/EFCC Official/Ibadan/2019).

When interviewing the Head, Prosecution Department regarding whether competition or conflict exists between the NPF and the ICPC in the operations of their jurisdictional powers, he said “No” (KII/M/ICPC Official/Abuja/2018), and further stated:

The NPF..., on their own, investigates corruption cases. Maybe when [a] petition comes in now at the time we usually investigate and the NPF is also investigating the issue, we will now write a letter to the NPF that please, we want to confirm whether you are investigating the case or not. If the NPF says ‘yes,’ we are almost concluding; we ask the same thing with the EFCC; if they say they are investigating a particular case, we will close the file (KII/M/ICPC Official/Abuja/2018).

In a KII session conducted with the Commissioner of Police at the Force Headquarters, Abuja, he stated that there is no reasonable clash of interests in the operations of jurisdictional partitioning of ACAs and the NPF. If there is friction, it is local one, which can easily be handled by the authority of the NPF. He explained thus:

There is no reasonable clash of interest. The Inspector General of the Police (IGP) can say a case in the Nigeria Police be transferred to the EFCC or the government is interested in it. If [that is so, the] case that has been investigated by the Nigeria Police [can] be transferred to the EFCC. There is no too much of frictions. There may be local frictions and that should be decided by the authority of the Police. And of course, even if you transfer a case from the Police to the EFCC, is it not policemen that are in the EFCC? (KII/M/Commissioner of Police/Abuja/2018).

An official of the EFCC who was interviewed on the issue of conflict among these agencies acknowledged the view that local/minor conflict is inevitable and that in recent times, the conflict has been resolved through the issue of “threshold,” especially between the NPF and the EFCC. According to him:

Areas of minor conflict are inevitable, but judging by recent history, these unexpected conflicts have been well-managed. Moreover, as regards the EFCC, there is an unwritten rule that a financial crime should reach a threshold before it can be handled; else, it is referred to the Police. Cases brought to the EFCC are also often referred to other agencies and law enforcement arms if such case(s) fall within their purview (KII/M/EFCC Official/Abuja/2018).

The Head, Economic and Governance, EFCC in Ibadan Zonal Office considered that threshold is a way of influencing anti-corruption institutions in such a way that an agency does not go beyond its capacity in terms of managing petitions that come to it, especially between the NPF, the EFCC and other agencies. He stated:

Because NPF is everywhere, there are certain petitions that come to the EFCC. After [an] initial preliminary investigation, we discover that it will be more effective, cost effective and it will more result-orientated to hand [it] over to the Police because they are of course, their coverage or that because of the volume of petitions the Commission received there is now a threshold; to say certain threshold has set up that if it doesn't meet this threshold,

then you will hand it over to the NPF...if the crime or a crime has been committed and you are not going to investigate it because of the capacity, then the Commission hands over some of these petitions to the NPF or other agencies (KII/M/EFCC Official/Ibadan/2019).

The Director of Investigations of the ICPC on threshold believed that threshold is an informal issue and that the ICPC does not emphasize threshold. There are many issues to be determined if the Commission will go into it. He explained:

...we should have been saying we have threshold but when facts of cases come, they may not fit into [a] particular threshold. Perhaps, there may be other issues that go beyond the money. It may be the importance of the crime that has been committed. The importance is in the sense of its danger to the society, its danger to the treasury, its danger to the national security. That is what will determine whether we will go into it or not (KII/M/ICPC Official/Abuja/2018).

The Head, Prosecution Department, ICPC, Abuja is of the opinion that instead of conflict of jurisdictions among the agencies, they always work in synergy. He explained:

There is a synergy in the anti-corruption practice. There are some cases that come to us. We will look at the substance of the case. We will just write the letter and forward it to the EFCC [because] under our Act, we don't have anything with [these] cases (KII/M/ICPC Official/Abuja/2018).

In a KII conducted, the Head, Media and Public Interface, EFCC, said that jurisdictional partitioning issues have influenced the operations of the anti-corruption institutions in form of collaboration. He stated:

The operation of the agencies is in [the] form of collaboration. First, we do help one another. I mean various law enforcement agencies to achieve our mandates. secondly, in the EFCC for instance, the Act provides that a NPF officer should be made the Chairman of the Commission. Even, most of the staff here are from NPF. Therefore, the relationship is okay

by me...The jurisdictional partitioning issues have enriched the inter-agency collaboration between the relevant agencies (KII/M/EFCC Official/Ibadan/2019).

An official in the Operation Unit of the Commission asserted:

There is a relationship in [the] form of cooperation or collaboration among the agencies. If there is a petition that does not fall within our jurisdiction, we do send it to the appropriate quarters (KII/M/EFCC Official/Abuja/2018).

The EFCC Act (2002); allows for some collaboration of the EFCC with other agencies or bodies on corruption. Section 6 (f) of the Act states that there shall be collaboration between the EFCC and government bodies internally and externally. Some of their functions include the identification and apprehension of persons suspected of being involved in economic and financial crimes.

The movement of proceeds derived from economic crimes is also expected to be monitored. The agencies are also expected to be involved in the exchange of personnel, the establishment and maintenance of the system for monitoring international crimes that border on the fiscal. These include maintaining statistics, data, records and reports, and determining the manifestation, extent, magnitude and effect of these crimes while advising the government of some of these functions to be covered (FRN, EFCC Act, 2004). Section 6 (g) also allows for joint operations. This facilitates the exchange of scientific and technical information that aid the fight against corruption (EFCC Act, 2004).

The federal government set up an Inter-Agency Task Team (IATT) in a bid to enhance collaboration among the agencies involved in anti-corruption activities in the country. The IATT follows the set-up of the Technical Unit on Governance and Anti-Corruption Reforms (TUGAR). Consequently, in order to eschew the frictions among the agencies and influence their operations, the heads of government agencies have together given a firm commitment towards actualizing the anti-corruption agenda of the Nigerian government. The establishment of IATT is key to addressing the peculiarity of Nigeria's anti-corruption campaign across multiple and operationally diverse institutions (FRN, Undated, Fact Sheet about Presidency IATT in Nigeria).

The IATT and TUGAR, work together to promote networking among the anti-corruption institutions mandated in Nigeria. The IATT ensures that there is inter-agency cooperation by helping the agencies to share information, knowledge and build capacity; and enhance the pursuits of various mandates including prosecution, investigation, research, and prevention. This effort has helped in galvanizing public support as regards the anti-corruption drive,

harnessing donor support for Nigeria's government in the pursuit of anti-corruption agenda (FRN, Fact Sheet on Presidency IATT).

An interviewed EFCC official said the collaboration has brought advantage to the fight against corruption and other related crimes in Nigeria. He reiterated "it has positively influenced the operations of the ACAs as it has so far engendered professionalism and specialization" (KII/M/EFCC Official/Abuja/2018). He spoke further:

The joint operations are seen in [the] form of training in terms of [the] handling of weapons, detection, investigation, providing backups for investigations and prosecutions and also providing manpower for fighting corruption in Nigeria. These operations continue up till today. That is the way in which we interface.

In a KII session with the Head, Public Affairs Department in Ibadan, he also emphasized the importance of collaboration, which encourages specialization of the agencies in combating corruption. he said:

When we specialize, [we] tend to do much better than [when] attempting everything. It helps in inter-agency relationship. When you talk about collaboration, it gives room to approach other agencies or sister' agencies in combating corruption.

From the above discussion, there is a clear indication that collaboration not only helps the anti-corruption agencies, it also leads to professionalism. One of the key factors that sabotage anti-corruption efforts in Nigeria is the absence of effective collaboration among the anti-corruption institutions (Iwuamdi, 2017). He argues that collaboration should go beyond government agencies to include the civil societies and business organizations in their anti-corruption campaign.

From the KII conducted with official of the EFCC, coordination is another mechanism through which jurisdictional partitioning issues influence the operation of anti-corruption institutions. He said that Section 7 of the EFCC Act of 2000 allows it to execute certain functions such as:

...coordinating power, coordination of the anti-corruption war or campaign as the case may be. In order words, the EFCC is responsible for coordinating all laws and activities involving economic and financial crimes; including powers that are bestowed on other agencies. There are areas of overlap, but there is coordination. Coordination ensures

that there is no friction. And, as a result, the EFCC has a part of its jurisdiction, put up structure in such that petitions that fall legally outside the mandate of the Commission are sent to sister agencies whose mandates [the] petition falls within. So, that is part of coordination mechanism.

Based on the foregoing, it is quite clear from the conducted KIIs with the officials of the ICPC, the EFCC, and the Police, and based on the consulted archival materials of the agencies that jurisdictional partitioning issues among the agencies influence their operations. The mechanisms through which the influence is manifested are collaboration, threshold, and coordination for better enforcement of their mandates so that the fight against corruption can have great impact on the nation. Globally, it has been confirmed that this partnership supported by the coercive powers of government and its agencies always yield changes that reduce corruption (OSIWA, 2016).

Therefore, findings show that collaborative opportunities encourage professionalism and specialization in the anti-corruption institutions' practices, thus leading to some measure of synergy, coordination and threshold mechanisms for intelligence gathering in combating corruption and financial related crimes in Nigeria. These findings further contribute to existing knowledge on the issue of opportunities in exercising policing powers by the anti-corruption agencies in Nigeria.

The structural-functional approach agrees with the finding on jurisdictional partitioning issues between the NPF and the agencies (ICPC and EFCC) for combating corruption and financial crimes and the way jurisdictional partitioning issues influence the ways of combating corruption in Nigeria. Structural-functional theory posits that political system needs to perform certain functions (attainment, integration, adaptation and pattern maintenance) to remain on-going. The ACAs should perform the functions of combating corruption if they want to be relevant. The ACAs perform different functions in their Acts. Besides, the structural-functional approach emphasizes integration as a role the state should play. The role agrees with the finding that ACAs should collaborate in spite of their different jurisdictions in the fight against corruption in Nigeria. Therefore, the collaboration of these agencies involved in anti-corruption activities should corroborate integration of the structural-functional approach while combating corruption in Nigeria.

Also, the finding of collaboration agrees with the Public Choice Theory, which indicates that corruption can be reduced in post-contractual society if effective enforcement systems are safeguarded to force collaboration and obedience. The Public Choice Theory agrees with the finding because collaboration of these agencies in combating corruption will enhance an effective enforcement

system. This ensures that one ACA may not effectively combat corruption without the efforts of other agencies in the Nigeria state.

Conclusion and Recommendations

This paper has looked at the jurisdictional partitioning issues among the agencies involved in combating corruption in Nigeria. It has also examined how these agencies influence their operations despite jurisdictional conflicts that arise from their shared powers and interactions as well as the benefit that can derive from such relations. However, the study concludes that the interactions between NPF and the specialized anti-corruption agencies of ICPC and EFCC have mixed consequences. While conflicts have occurred between the NPF and specialized ACAs, there is still collaboration and synergy in their operations. This collaborative opportunity has led to professionalism and specialization which may enhance anti-corruption drive in Nigeria. Having examined the jurisdictional partitioning issues and the influence of the ACAs operations, the following recommendations are made:

First, in order to strengthen their relationship, the NPF and these agencies should embark on consensus driven anti-corruption policies and practices. In order to achieve this, the ACAs should deepen their collaboration and complement one another's policing duties through credible intelligence gathering and sharing in their operations.

Two, the activities of the ACAs should be streamlined. This can be achieved by involving in strategic management with relevant institutions and stakeholders to push for reforms of their Acts to ensure clarity of functions. This will help to avoid unnecessary conflict and confusion when enforcing their powers. This is necessary to avoid "double jeopardy." That is to say, whenever an investigation or prosecution is done by one agency, another anti-corruption institution need not make another investigation or prosecution regarding the same crime.

Three, there should be capacity building for different agencies of government involved in anti-corruption in order to enhance anti-corruption goals and objectives. The capacity building should be tailored towards effective collaboration in the fight against corruption. The consequences of not working together culminates in increasing fear of diminished trust in the capacities of the anti-corruption system. Therefore, capacity building here will promote conflict resolution among the personnel of ACAs in Nigeria.

Four, the ACAs should build trust among themselves and avoid unhealthy rank comparisons between agencies to enhance the efficient fight against corruption. However, when there is trust among the ACAs, it will promote smooth inter-agency relations and the fight against corruption will be more efficient and effective in Nigeria.

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