TESTING LOWI'S POLICY TYPES
ON CROATIAN PUBLIC POLICIES

Ana PETEK

Associate professor, Faculty of Political Science,
University of Zagreb, Croatia
E-mail: ana.petek@fpzg.hr

Abstract

The public policy classification developed by Theodore Lowi is one of the most frequently referenced, utilized, and debated frameworks in political science. This paper delves into the question of whether the concepts of distributive, redistributive, regulatory, and constitutive policies can be applied to the context of Eastern Europe. To explore this issue, a subnational comparative research design was developed to examine six Croatian public policies (economic policy, social policy, education, gender equality, media, and culture). The primary method of data collection involved expert reports, akin to Lowi's original research approach. The characteristics of sampled sectors were summarized through open coding conducted at three levels, allowing for a comparison with Lowi's policy types. The findings indicate that the fundamental idea of this seminal taxonomy, which highlights the variation in links between policy and politics within a single country, remains relevant. Additionally, the analysis revealed that policy goals, policy instruments, non-state actors, and their relationships with state actors are fundamental features upon which classification should be based. Future research endeavors should aim to construct a robust methodological framework with clear indicators for selected features corresponding to each policy type. This would enhance the sophistication and empirical applicability of the theory, allowing for a more nuanced understanding of policymaking dynamics in diverse contexts.

Keywords: Theodore Lowi, policy classification, distributive, redistributive, regulatory, constitutive, Croatian policymaking

Introduction

Policy research is primarily conducted through case studies, typically focusing on a specific public policy to track stability or change within a single sector of policymaking. However, comparative policy research, which seeks to identify policy variations across different jurisdictions or within the same unit, offers numerous advantages (John, 1998, pp. 12-20). Particularly, cross-sectoral comparison, although often overlooked in policy sciences, holds significant potential (Heidenheimer, 1986; Hofferbert & Cingranelli, 1996; Lodge, 2007; Petak, 2002; Pierce et al., 2017; Schmitt, 2013; Tosun & Workman, 2023; Wilder, 2017). On one hand, extracting similarities and differences among sectors within a country aid in drawing general conclusions about the overall functioning of the political system and enables the retrieval of more general insights into policymaking across various domains. On the other hand, given the practical need for coordination among sectors in the complex landscape of policymaking today, understanding overlaps, interactions, and spillovers across policies becomes an essential prerequisite for effective governance.

To conduct cross-sectoral comparisons, classifications of public policies are employed. One of the most enduring and widely used classifications in policy research and political science is Theodore Lowi's classification, which includes regulatory, distributive, constitutive, and redistributive policy types (Lowi, 2009). Despite being subject to numerous criticisms and attempts at improvement, Lowi's concepts continue to feature prominently in policy textbooks (e.g., Birkland, 2019, pp. 395-441) and recent research papers (e.g., Schenkel, 2024). However, there remains a lack of consensus regarding the abandonment or acceptable modification of Lowi's concepts.

As the value of theoretical frameworks lies in their applicability across contexts and in their ability to extend their scope, "particularly beyond Western democracies" (Weible, 2023, pp. 357), the fundamental research question of this paper is as follows: What is the applicability of Lowi's policy classification to Croatian public policies? Croatia was selected as an antipode to the USA, where Lowi's concepts were developed, due to stark differences in size and historical development, as well as cultural, social, and political context. This choice was made to create a "hostile" environment for testing the theory. Additionally, Croatia was chosen because, like other countries in Eastern Europe, it has received very little attention in international comparative policy studies (Engeli, Rothmayr Allison, and Montpetit, 2018). The aim of this investigation is to provide an empirically grounded evaluation of Lowi's concepts. As the empirical part of the paper follows a qualitative methodology, there are no explicit predetermined hypotheses about the potential scope of the applicability.

The overall research design of the paper is grounded in cross-sectoral comparative public policy analysis. Initially, I will provide a concise review and summary of the extensive literature on Lowi's classification, encompassing his work and that of numerous other authors influenced by Lowi. Following this, I will determine the most appropriate approach to interpret Lowi's theory and proceed to elucidate the characteristics of his four policy types: distributive, regulatory, redistributive, and constitutive policy.

The empirical analysis is driven by the following research sub-question, necessary to prepare empirical material for the application of Lowi's theory: What are the essential characteristics of Croatian policymaking? To address this question, I will analyze six Croatian policies for which data was collected through simplified expert reports obtained via an open-questioned questionnaire. The detailed textual material on Croatian policymaking will then be analyzed and summarized using an open coding method. This process will entail a three-step coding procedure, wherein the features of Croatian policymaking are systematically extracted for each policy in the sample, and subsequently compared across sectors. The paper will culminate by juxtaposing the characteristics of Lowi's four policy types with those of Croatian policymaking, thereby illustrating how the messy reality of policymaking, which is often so challenging to classify, nonetheless resonates with Lowi's foundational ideas. In conclusion, I stress the significance of continuing to refine and develop Lowi's classification in future research endeavors. I propose key characteristics that should serve as the foundation for constructing a robust methodological framework, which should provide precise indicators for each policy type in the theory's future enhancements.

Lowi's policy classification

The most renowned policy classification, heavily critiqued yet ubiquitous in policy textbooks, scholarly articles, and even political discourse, is Theodore Lowi's classification of constitutive, distributive, regulatory, and redistributive policy types (Lowi, 1964, 1970, 1972, 1988, 1995, 1997, 2009, 2010). Numerous scholars have commented on and scrutinized these types, with many attempting to refine them (e.g., Anderson, 1997; Bickers & Williams, 2001; Birkland, 2019; Greenberg et al., 1977; Gustavsson, 1980; Heckathorn & Maser, 1990; Heinelt, 2006; Hill, 2010; Howlett, 1991, 2009; Ingram & Schneider, 1993; Kellow, 1988, 2009; Kjellberg, 1977; Miller, 1990; Mooney & Schuldt, 2008; Nicholson, 2002; Petek, 2014; Ripley & Franklin, 1987; Sheffer, 1977; Smith, 2002; Spitzer, 1987; Steinberger, 1980; Tatalovich & Daynes, 1984, 2011; Tolbert, 2002). Despite being over half a century old and sometimes labeled as outdated, Lowi's four policy types continue to appear in

the latest research papers (e.g., Kuhlmann & Blum, 2021; Lee & Yu, 2020; Lock & Davidson, 2023; Schenkel, 2024; Taysum & Salha, 2024). Two main reasons can be highlighted for the persistence of Lowi's classification.

Firstly, Lowi introduces and develops a unique political science perspective within the field of policy sciences by emphasizing the interconnectedness of politics and policy. He contends that understanding both policy and politics requires an examination of their dynamic relationship, highlighting how different policy contents influence political participation and procedures, and vice versa (Heckathorn & Maser, 1990, p. 1104; Heinelt, 2006, p. 109; Gustavsson, 1980, p. 124; Ingram & Schneider, 1993, p. 68; Lowi, 1964, p. 688, 2001; Kellow, 1988, pp. 716-717; Kjellberg, 1977, p. 555; Nicholson, 2002, p. 175; Steinberger, 1980, p. 185; Tosun & Workman, 2023, p. 333).[1] Secondly, Lowi elaborates on how this dynamic operates across diverse arenas of power within a single country, suggesting that findings and conclusions on policymaking cannot be fully grasped at the level of the political system. According to Lowi, political systems consist of multiple political processes that systematically vary in relation to distinguishable sets of policy sectors (Gustavsson, 1980, pp. 125-126; Kjellberg, 1977, p. 556; Sheffer, 1977, pp. 536-539).[2]

Lowi's policy classification is grounded in empirical insights about political decision-making in the USA (Lowi, 1964, pp. 678-686, 2009, pp. 1-19; Kellow, 2009, p. 289; Kjellberg, 1977, p. 555). His empirical investigation revealed the existence of several long-term governance arrangements determined by specific historical developments (Howlett, 2009, p. 76; Lowi, 1964, p. 689, 1970, p. 320, 1972, pp. 301-307, 2009, p. 21; Nicholson, 2002, pp.167, 175). All arenas of power that form distinctive political structures over time present functional specialization of government through sets of interconnected policies (Lowi, 1988, p. xi, 2009, p. 17). Therefore, arenas of power or policy types result from diverse historical eras of political system functional development.[3]

Most authors examining Lowi's classification focus on the criteria for differentiating among policy types installed later into his theory (Greenberg et al, 1977, pp. 1532-1534; Gustavsson, 1980, p. 128; Heckathorn & Maser, 1990, p. 1103; Hill, 2010, p. 132; Kellow, 1988, p. 714; Kjellberg, 1977, p. 557;

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[1] This is famous Lowi's notion how policy determines politics (1972, p. 299; 1988, p. xi).

[2] "*Arenas of Power*, the book, brings the best of Lowi's work together in one volume, and shows just how much we all owe him for the understanding we have of the public policy subfield of political science" (Kellow, 2009, p. 491).

[3] In recent decades, on the turn of the centuries, there were trends of introducing market-like governance into policymaking, and also network governance that institutionalizes state-civil society cooperation within the constitutive policies, called the re-regulation and re-constitutive era (Howlett, 2009, p. 77; Petek, 2009, p. 278, 2012, 2014).

Nicholson, 2002, p. 169; Smith, 2002; Spitzer, pp. 1987:678; Steinberger, 1980, pp. 186-187). This typological version of the classification[4] inherently faces the problem of categories not being mutually exclusive, making it challenging for concrete empirical public policies to fit into only one type.[5] Hence, I will use Lowi's classification as a taxonomy, not as a positive or formal policy theory but as an empirical policy theory (Beyme, 1996, p. 523; James, 2019; Smith, 2002), as Lowi's work fundamentally constitutes an empirical policy theory, being derived from empirical observation and data. My aim is to preserve the original idea of arenas of power, which seems more scientifically valid than focusing on rigorous criteria and a four-cell matrix. A taxonomical interpretation of Lowi's theory can accommodate mixed cases and is more coherent with complex examples from practice undergoing transformations or broadening in scope. Thus, I argue that the taxonomical approach is the only valid understanding and interpretation of Lowi's classification work. According to all elaborated arguments, now I will present the theory of policy regimes or arenas of power as sets of policy-politics link characteristics.

Each policy type comprises ten main features (see Table 1). Firstly, every regime entails the (1) concrete function of the state, delineating what the state accomplishes: constitutive policies shape the state and society by determining constitutional arrangements and human rights; regulatory policies govern business and market behavior; and (re)distributive policies allocate state material resources or wealth in general among social groups (Anderson, 1997, pp. 276-277; Hill, 2010, p. 132; Heckathorn & Maser, 1990, p. 1116; Kellow, 2009, p. 487; Nicholson, 2002, p. 169; Lowi, 1964, p. 690, 2009, pp. 67, 162). Subsequently, arenas vary in terms of the (2) overall power structure or the dominant pattern of politics, which could manifest as clientelist (distributive), pluralistic (regulatory), elitist and corporatist (redistributive), or closed statism or policy networks (in constitutive policies; Lowi, 1964, pp. 692, 695; Kellow, 1988, pp. 719-721, Petek, 2012, pp. 124-172).

Also, (3) primary non-state actors involved vary: economic actors, such as firms, corporations, business lobbies, and professional associations, are most prominent in regulatory policies; small, well-organized interests in distributive policies (such as farmers, war veterans, or local units); political parties, unions, and peak associations stand out in redistributive policies; and constitutive policies are characterized by the lack of non-state actors, or by the action of

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[4] Typology conceptually separates specific set of items by some dimensions that are based on ideal type. In difference, taxonomies classify items by their empirically observable and measurable features (Smith, 2002, 381).

[5] The most used version of criteria, usually present in textbooks, is related to cost and benefits, narrowly concentrated on a small, specified group or broadly distributed on the whole population, interpreted as policy goals and policy instruments (for detailed elaboration, see Petek, 2014).

civil sector actors and citizens (Lowi, 1964, p. 693, 711, 2009, p. 122; Tolbert, 2002). In continuation of this 'politics' aspect of policy regimes with the previous two features, actors create diverse (4) forms of political relations: distributive policies are marked by mutual non-interference, logrolling, and pork-barrel, relations based on cooperation and cooptation; redistributive policies show ideological disputes; moral and identity disputes are present in constitutive policies; and finally, regulatory policies contain bargaining and negotiations (Lock & Davidson, 2023, p. 4; Petek, 2014, pp. 368-373; Lowi, 1964, p. 713, 2009, pp. 35, 75; Tatalovich & Daynes, 1984, 2011).

I will continue with the policy characteristics of arenas of power/policy regimes that provide information on (5) policy goals and (6) policy instruments. Goals within distributive policies aim for gains and the promotion of important special interests, contrasting with redistributive goals set to enhance public interests, improve economic and social safety for all citizens, and advance their equality (Gustavsson, 1980, p. 131; Howlett, 1991, p. 2; Lowi, 1964, pp. 690, 707). Constitutive policies also target public interest, primarily focusing not on material well-being as in redistribution, but on social inclusion, integrating all citizens into all aspects of community life (Kellow, 1988, pp. 719-721; Petek, 2012, pp. 77, 88-89). Regulatory policies favor special economic interests individually within their goals, aiming to enhance the economy as a whole in the second step (Howlett, 1991, p. 2). Related to goals are policy instruments, the second crucial feature of policy design in any sector. They also vary according to policy regimes, so (re)distributive policies accomplish goals through financial instruments, and redistributive policies add public services provided by the broad public sector to the implementation (Lowi, 1964, pp. 705-707; 1997, p. 284). Regulatory and constitutive policies mainly work through regulation, but many incentives are also necessary. In constitutive policies, policy instruments based on information such as public campaigns, marketing, advising, education, and reporting are also important (Anderson, 1997; Bickers & Williams, 2001, p. 170; Kjellberg, 1977; Lowi, 1964, p. 690, 1972, p. 300, 1988, p. xiv; Petek, 2014, pp. 368-373; Ripley & Franklin, 1987; Spitzer, 1987).

The subsequent three features are additional observations of policy regimes. They are (7) unstable and change over time; thus, it is observed how distributive policies are temporary and periodical; the regulatory arena has an unstable structure; on the other hand, redistributive arenas have quite a stable, almost institutionalized structure; and constitutive policies are dominantly procedural public policies or reform governmental structure and procedures (Heinelt, 2006; Kjellberg, 1977, p. 558; Lowi, 1964, pp. 711-713; Nicholson, 2002, p. 169). Then, (8) the level or type of conflict differs in connection with policy and politics variables or characteristics of arenas of power. Distributive policies usually have no conflict, as "winners" and "losers" of single temporary projects

never meet; the regulatory arena has often and more direct conflicts; as in the redistributive arena that is marked with electoral, class, and party conflicts; in difference with non-economic conflicts in constitutive policies (Bickers & Williams, 2011, p. 168; Heckathorn & Maser, 1990, p. 1109; Tatalovich & Daynes, 2011). Finally, the sets have different (9) visibility in the public; low for distributive policies and in regulatory policies that are quite hidden from the public eye; on the other hand, redistributive and constitutive arenas are marked by many public debates and deliberations (Birkland, 2019, pp. 416-419; Gustavsson, 1980, p. 131; Petek, 2014, pp. 368-373).

There is no inherent logic nor teleological reasoning why some policies form some arenas, but (10) adjectival policies within specific policy regimes have developed through history. Examples of distributive policies include various subsidies, such as those in agriculture, land policy, tariff policy, and diverse local projects, often regarded as patronage policies (Birkland, 2019, pp. 412-414; Lowi, 1972, p. 300, 1988, p. xi, 1997, p. 283, 2009, p. 95). Regulatory policies primarily encompass economic policies, such as the elimination of substandard goods, addressing unfair competition or fraudulent advertising, or trade policy (Miller, 1990, p. 895; Lowi, 1972, p. 300). Redistributive policies fall within the domain of social policies, including progressive income tax, and social security policy (Lowi, 1972, p. 300), as well as pension policy, health policy, social welfare policy, family policy, or housing policy. Classical constitutive policies include electoral policy, national security policy, public administration reform policy, fundamental rights policy, and penal policy (Spitzer, 1987, p. 680); whereas newer policies encompass protective economic regulation, environmental policy, consumer protection policy, as well as various moral policies such as abortion policy, gun control policy, death penalty policy, euthanasia policy, or identity policies such as youth policy or disability policy (Mooney & Schuldt, 2008; Petek, 2012; Ripley & Franklin, 1987; Tatalovich & Daynes, 1984, 2011; Wilson, 1984, pp. 88-89).

Table 1: Lowi's types conceptualized as sets of characteristics

Characteristic	DISTRIBUTIVE	REGULATORY	REDISTRIBUTIVE	CONSTITUTIVE	
Content of state function	Allocation of state material resources	Arranging business behavior	Reallocation of resources among social groups	State and society building	
Pattern of politics	Clientelism	Pluralism	Elitism / corporatism	Statism	Policy networks
Primary non-state actors	Small, well-organized interest groups	Economic actors	Peak associations, unions, political parties	No non-state actors	NGOs Citizens
Political relations	Mutual non-interference Logrolling Pork-barrel	Bargaining (Secret) negotiations	Ideological disputes	Based on identity and moral issues	
Goals	Gains and promotion of important special interests	Favoring special economic interests (to enhance economy)	Public interests (economic and social safety of all citizens)	Public interests (social inclusion)	
Policy instruments	Public finances	Regulations	Public finances Public services	Regulations Information and persuasion	
Stability / change	Temporary and periodical	Unstable structure	Stable and institutionalized	Procedural or reform	
Conflict	Almost no conflicts	Often and direct	Partisan	Non-economic issues and conflicts	
Visibility	Low visibility	Quite hidden from public	Public debates	Public deliberation	
Adjectival policies – classical examples	Local policies Agricultural grants	Economic policies Trade policy	Social policies	Classical (elections, national security) Newer (protection regulation, social regulation in moral policies, identity policies)	

Source: Petek, 2014, p. 369.

Methodological framework

Research is conducted within the scope of qualitative methodology, which is suited to extract descriptions and detailed features of policymaking. Data gathering was carried out through simplified expert reports or expert-written interviews. This method relies on highly qualified interviewees answering questions in an extensive written form or report (Torfing, 2007, pp. 74-78). Expert reports are recognized and named as a relevant qualitative data-gathering method in newer methodological books, but they bear a resemblance to Lowi's research style and his approach to inventing arenas of power. Lowi studied Congressional decision-making by summarizing a series of case studies of legislative policymaking. He identified eight basic elements or features that he sought in every decision (Lowi, 1972).[6] Thus, he gathered data by "interviewing" experts, treating their published case studies as written interviews or reports.

Research on Croatian policymaking utilized a simplified version of expert reports in the form of a questionnaire. Questionnaires were distributed to 54 experts, with 21 responses received. Prior to providing a report on policymaking, each expert had to specify the policy on which their description was based. The questionnaire offered 29 sectors, inspired by Compston's policy classification (Compston, 2005, p. 2; for the questionnaire, see Appendix 1). Only two respondents provided separate answers for two policies, and these were treated as two completed questionnaires. Therefore, a total of 23 descriptions of Croatian policymaking were collected. For analysis in this paper, during the coding process, only sectors with at least three responses were selected to ensure dense answers suitable for qualitative analysis. Consequently, the following sectors were included: 1. economic policy, 2. social policy (combining family, pension, social welfare, and housing policy), 3. education policy, 4. gender equality policy, 5. media policy, and 6. culture policy. The final sample of policies was sufficiently diverse to capture different policy types within Croatian policymaking.

Descriptions of policymaking by the experts was guided by two main open questions. The aim was to obtain essay-like answers that are comparable by elements of content. The basic idea that inspired the questions was the classic stages model of the policy process, which can easily guide experts outside policy sciences on all instances of the policymaking process. The main questions were: (1) How is the policy problem that you research put onto the

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[6] Those were: (1) primary units (what is typical participant in process); (2) relationships among those unit(s) (logrolling, bargaining, ideological); (3) level of stability of those relationships among unit(s); (4) bureaucracy-professionalism factor; (5) lobby role; (6) committee role; (7) floor role; and (8) executive role (Lowi, 1972, pp. 304-305).

agenda and how are its alternative solutions shaped? (2) How is the policy that you explore implemented, and how are its results evaluated? Both questions were elaborated by 15 sub-questions each. These sub-questions served as prompts for the respondents, indicating the elements that their descriptions should contain (for the questionnaire, see Appendix 1).

All answers from the filled questionnaires were compiled into a single 50-page dense document containing a thick description of Croatian policymaking. This extensive textual material was then submitted for further analysis. The basic data processing and analysis technique used was a mode of open coding (Halmi, 2005, pp. 349-352; Pandit, 1996; Strübing, 2011, p. 1056; Thomas, 2006). The selection of this data-driven coding technique was guided by the intention of minimizing theoretical bias as much as possible. Data was coded through three levels of codes. For this purpose, a simple three-column table was constructed, with levels of codes from 1 to 3 arranged from left to right. Coding commenced with the specification of the research sub-question: What are the characteristics of Croatian policymaking? The selected textual fragments were expected to describe what policymaking in Croatia looks like or how specific policies are being formulated and implemented.

The first level of coding involved selecting fragments of text that constituted answers to the research sub-question. These quotations from the raw data, sometimes parts of sentences and sometimes a few sentences, were placed in column *Code 1*. The second column consists of *Code 2*, which comprises short labels for the extracted characteristics of policymaking in the first column. The coding process was bilingual. Since the raw material was in Croatian, the initial codes were also in Croatian. However, in the subsequent step of coding, the process continued in English. The final step of creating third-level codes involved grouping similar and connected labels from the second column into *Code 3*.

This step involves establishing basic categories that describe Croatian policymaking as its characteristics (see Table 2). All *Codes 3* are as follows: (1) a distinctive characteristic for each policy that could not be grouped into one joint code, (2) stability/change, (3) state actors, (4) non-state actors, (5) international actors, (6) relations among actors, (7) policy goals, (8) policy instruments, (9) visibility, (10) usage of analysis, and (11) style of decision-making. As is instantly obvious, *Code 3* is data-driven but still inspired by a summary of the characteristics of Lowi's policy types. At the end of the coding procedure, *Codes 3*, representing the most abstract level of coding, were extracted into new, separate tables, with their basic descriptions from *Codes 2* separated for each policy, to prepare material for the paper. An example of this process is presented in Appendix 2 for illustration purposes.[7]

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[7] Whole coding material is available from the author on request.

Table 2: *Code 3* represents main features of Croatian policymaking

1.	Distinctive characteristic
2.	Stability / change
3.	State actors
4.	Non-state actor
5.	International actors
6.	Actors' relations
7.	Policy goals
8.	Policy instruments
9.	Usage of analysis
10.	Style of decision-making
11.	Visibility

Therefore, the coding of expert reports on six Croatian policies extracted lists of their characteristics. These lists cannot be understood as comprehensive lists of all the features of selected sectors in Croatia, as my research is not based on deep case study analysis nor several sources, but solely on coding of minimally three expert reports on each sector. Hence, some features are likely missing. However, what is accomplished is that descriptions of sectors are comparable because of the equal data-gathering procedure and analysis driven by the same question.

Firstly, I will present each policy separately in the description section. Each main category of characteristics, or *Code 3*, will be explained by its elements in *Code 2* that were used for its development for each policy from the sample. Every feature in the description is uniformly numbered throughout the whole paper according to the *Code 3* number in Table 2, to facilitate navigation in dense qualitative descriptions and to enhance their understanding. Then, in the comparative analysis section, in the second step, all described features will be summarized into a text matrix (Schnider, 2012, pp. 222-225) to stress similarities and differences among features of Croatian policies. The purpose of this section is to determine if we can establish arenas of power in Croatia by detecting multiple policy regimes. In the final discussion section, thirdly, all the empirical findings will be confronted with Lowi's types, and all the details of their characteristics summarized in Table 1, to prepare a final evaluation of the applicability of Lowi's theory in Croatia.

Description: characteristics of Croatian public policies

Economic policies in Croatia exhibit a tendency towards (2) change driven by various economic factors such as disruptions of economic balance, external economic shocks, or domestic structural problems. Occasionally, change is instigated by pressure from interest groups or directives from the EU. Among the state actors (3), ministries hold evident dominance, along with influence from the central bank. While different working groups for law proposals are regularly organized, their influence remains relatively low. Within the realm of non-state actors, (4) influential entities include large and homogeneous interest groups such as pensioners' associations, unions, farmers, and professional associations. Notably, employer groups emerge as particularly influential. Conversely, some consultants and scientists have direct links to governments, albeit their impact on policymaking is sporadic. Small social groups, which are poorly organized and lack representation (such as sectors without unions, crafts, small entrepreneurs, NGOs, etc.), as well as media, citizens, and think tanks, possess minimal influence and constitute a group of weak non-state actors. Additionally, political parties are included in this category, as they seldom react only after receiving input from other actors. International actors (5) also play a role in shaping economic policies in Croatia. Entities such as the EU, World Bank, and other international financial institutions exert influence on policymaking processes.

In terms of (6) relations among actors, the expert reports emphasize the presence of strong and covert connections between the government and employers. Additionally, certain interest groups have their own representatives within the government. When it comes to (7) policy goals, they are often crafted to favor the benefits of specific interest groups, with citizens' interests typically not receiving significant focus. Regarding (8) policy instruments, regulations play a pivotal role, encompassing various prohibitions, guidelines, and strategies. Experts also highlight how economic policies are shaped by instruments such as overall tax levels, budget allocations, and the involvement of public enterprises. Moreover, economic policies are characterized by a (9) lack of analysis in decision-making, as systematic research or the utilization of knowledge from monitoring and evaluations is either absent or of low quality, often initiated at the behest of international actors. The (10) style of decision-making in economic policies, as described by experts, is characterized as ad hoc, expedited, haphazard, lacking consistency, relying on intuition, exhibiting low coordination, and featuring (11) poor quality in policy communication and public deliberation.

Social policies are primarily characterized by (1) political voluntarism, where the interests of the political elite take precedence, leading to a process marked by politicization and neglect of expert input. (2) Change in social policies is

often instigated by foreign actors and external pressures. Within the realm of (3) state actors, ministries wield significant influence, along with the Constitutional Court and local government units. Despite formal decentralization efforts, the welfare system remains largely centralized, although there is notable fragmentation among ministries and between ministries and local government units, particularly evident in family policy. Among (4) non-state actors, political parties (representing political elites) are identified as crucial players, alongside pensioner associations, labor unions, lobbies representing politically influential social groups, and the Catholic Church. Croatian scientists and experts are present but often considered irrelevant, as well as NGOs and other religious organizations. Building lobbies hold considerable power in housing policy, albeit operating discreetly. In terms of (5) international actors, experts mention the EU, foreign governments that used to be involved in aid projects in Croatia, as well as the World Bank and IMF. International actors do not play a significant role only in housing policy.

The topic of (6) relations is not extensively described in reports. They only mention that family policy, and demographics, stem from big national identity passions so they are used in political mobilization. Also, a part of the political elite is closely connected to the building lobby as its clients. In section (7) policy goals, it is clearly set that social policies are formed for the interests of large groups of citizens. But there is also a critique. Often narrow interest perspectives prevail and there is no consideration for the system as a whole. About (8) policy instruments, experts report how social policies spend large amounts of public money (except in family policy). Some regulations and agencies are mentioned, as well as services. Social policies are also marked with the lack of (9) analysis, as priorities do not come from research of needs, and evaluations and monitoring are sporadic, mostly done under the influence of the EU and often ignored. The (10) style of decision-making is politicized, elemental, irrational, and erratic, not logical or advisedly created, with insufficient coordination, (11) biased public debates, and with no real deliberations and with an uninformed public. Certain topics within social policies receive significant media coverage and public attention, while others of equal importance are overlooked.

Education policy's distinctive characteristic, mentioned "all around," is (1) reform. Old elements of the education system are deemed durable, even when they perform poorly by international standards. Reforms are slow or halted, mainly due to the dominance of a segment of the scientific community that seeks to maintain the status quo to preserve its monopoly. Additionally, educational policy is characterized by (2) Europeanization, as a significant driver of change has been harmonization with European policies. Educational policy primarily adopts goals through "importing," with the EU often used as an "excuse" for various decisions. This is deemed more important than the

ministry's activities, although the ministry still dominates among (3) state actors. Local units are also highlighted in this sector, despite criticism of only a "half-decentralization" of the school system in Croatia. Among (4) non-state actors, certain segments of the academic community, particularly in natural sciences, are considered influential. However, unions, students, and the remainder of the academic community are not influential, although they are becoming more active. Media trivialize educational policy, according to expert evaluations. Among (5) international actors, the EU, World Bank, and OECD are mentioned.

(6) Relations among actors are only marginally and sporadically described, with an emphasis on the importance of personal connections. Goals are not mentioned, and in terms of (8) instruments, laws are considered essential, although there are some strategies for the sector. Additionally, public finances play a significant role. Regarding (9) analysis in educational policy, the same issues are highlighted – underutilization of small research capacities, lack of systematic data gathering on implementation prerequisites, irregular evaluation practices, and neglect of educational sciences. The (10) decision-making style is primarily characterized as top-down, rapid, and abrupt, lacking transparency and coordination, and (11) featuring "alibi" deliberations.

Gender equality policy is primarily characterized as (1) new, with change primarily driven by (2) Europeanization, emphasizing the acceptance of European values, trends, and experiences as crucial for setting priorities. Fulfilling EU and international obligations is a key driver of change. Among the (3) state actors, there is a dominant governmental office for gender equality, as there is no separate ministry for this policy. However, all ministries are formally involved, and there is a rich institutional design for this sector. In terms of (4) non-state actors, NGOs play a dominant role, pressuring for change and functioning as quasi-state services. Prominent individuals, scientists, feminist activists, and theorists are also highlighted. As weak non-state actors, citizens are noted for their minimal involvement. Mentioned in the group of (5) international actors are the EU, Council of Europe, and UN.

The only (6) relationship among actors mentioned in this sector is the cooperation between the state and NGOs, especially through sub-contracting. In the gender equality policy, the code of (7) policy goals states equality quite clearly, with criticisms about neglecting public interests, similar to other sectors. In the code of (8) policy instruments, the emphasis is on changing social awareness through information, advocacy, awareness, and education. However, there is a lack of sanctions for non-implementation. Like in other sectors, there is a lack of (9) analysis. The (10) style of decision-making mirrors the marginal political position of gender issues, as only special dates or radical events (such as domestic violence) produce occasional attention, and there is a significant

implementation gap. Also, there are (11) no ongoing public debates on gender issues.

Media policy is distinguished by (1) technology, as technological development plays a crucial role in shaping this sector. Additionally, (2) Europeanization strongly influences media policy, with policymaking often being subordinated to EU directives. Among (3) state actors, the ministry holds dominance, along with regulatory agencies (e.g., for broadcasting) and the parliamentary committee. While different working groups for law proposals and strategic planning are regularly organized by the government, they often yield little impact. In the realm of (4) non-state actors, powerful business lobbies hold significant influence, alongside media experts, professional associations, and political parties. Conversely, weak non-state actors are NGOs and citizen initiatives that represent public interest and audiences. Additionally, publishers, journals, certain professionals, and unions are categorized as weak non-state actors as well. Among (5) international actors, only the EU and its Commission are mentioned.

In the realm of (6) relations among actors, reports highlight the prevalence of secrecy within the regulation procedure and the significance of lobbying based on personal connections. Additionally, political parties are noted to align their positions on media policy within the parliamentary committee. Dual (7) goals are described: professionalism and the role of media in society, as well as media diversity, contrasted with the stability of the market, the growth of the economic sector, and entrepreneurship. However, it is emphasized, as in other policies, that the partial interests of political elites and certain lobbies or narrow professional interests often supersede public interest. In terms of (8) policy instruments, regulations such as standards and sanctions are mentioned, along with the utilization of concessions. Media policy is further shaped by informing, persuasion efforts, and some public financing. Analysis, or lack thereof, poses challenges in media policy as systematic monitoring or evaluation is lacking. The (10) style of decision-making is characterized by superficial judgments and improvisation, accompanied by (11) limited public deliberation, often presenting an illusion of genuine debate.

Culture policy stands out with its emphasis on (1) diversity, representing an extremely broad scope of this sector and the activities within it. According to expert reports, (2) change is relatively rare in this policy domain, typically occurring only in response to overall budget adjustments or the initiatives of influential individuals, resulting in a predominantly stagnant state of affairs. Similar to other policies, the (3) dominance of the ministry in the process is evident, with almost all actors other than the political or governmental elite being excluded. The involvement of local units, particularly major cities and the capital, is noteworthy in shaping culture policy. Within the realm of (4) non-state actors, certain cultural organizations wield influence, while experts and

the cultural public are considered less influential. Among the (5) international actors, only the Council of Europe is noted.

In terms of (6) actor relations, the significance of personal connections with the minister is emphasized, particularly in stakeholder consultations, highlighting the importance of such relationships in shaping policy outcomes. Additionally, some mention is made of state-NGO relations through subcontracting arrangements. As for (7) policy goals, the focus lies on enhancing quality of life, fostering identity, promoting economic and social development, and embracing market orientation within the cultural industry. However, similar to other policy areas, there's a noted neglect of public interests, with professionals often imposing their own interests as representative of the public good. Within the (8) instruments category, reports indicate a lack of an overarching strategy, with only some financial planning evident in the sector. Primary instruments include public finances, supported by some laws and regulations, with particular importance placed on the cultural public sector. Lastly, the codes for (9) analysis highlight a deficiency in utilizing knowledge and trend indicators and a lack of standardized evaluation in cultural policy. The (10) decision-making style is characterized by inertia, low participation, and infrequent elevation to a political issue, all contributing to a (11) scarcity of public deliberation on cultural policy matters.

Comparative analysis of Croatian policy features

To compare the features of policymaking across six Croatian policies, a summary of all described characteristics is presented in a text matrix (see Table 3). The first column displays *Code3* for all six sectors. Subsequently, each column corresponds to one sampled policy. In each cell corresponding to a policy, condensed elements from *Code 2* are provided to facilitate the extraction of similarities and differences among the sectors.

Three codes are nearly identical across all sectors and serve as primary similarities among the analyzed sectors: (9) the absence of analysis in policymaking; (10) the disorganized and arbitrary style of decision-making characterized by ad hoc, rapid, intuitive, and uncoordinated approaches; and (11) the lack of substantial public debates on policy issues and solutions within specific sectors. Codes related to analysis and decision-making are omitted from the text matrix, as they do not contribute significantly to further comparison, because they do not vary across potential arenas of power.[8] Only

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[8] For corroborating insights regarding the significant influence of the EU and Europeanization on Croatian policymaking, as well as the notable absence of rationality in Croatian policymaking, see Petek (2021).

the visibility code is included in the table, despite demonstrating no variation among policies, as it directly aligns with Lowi's theory. Two additional commonalities across all sectors are apparent in Table 3. Firstly, there exists a significant predominance of governmental ministries (3) in policymaking across all sectors. Secondly, experts emphasize the neglect of public interests in the aspect of goals (7) for all policies. All shared characteristics likely stem from Croatia's status of being a new democracy and young post-transition state in the 21st century when I examine its policymaking. However, this does not preclude the existence of arenas of power.

The analysis reveals important differences among sectors. Each policy (except for economic policies) is characterized by a (1) distinctive code that sets it apart, such as political voluntarism, emphasis on reform, policy novelty, breadth and diversity, or influence of technology. Additionally, policies vary in the participation of other (3) state actors besides the ministry, with some involving the central bank, constitutional court, regulatory agencies, or parliamentary committees. Three policies include a prominent role of local units (social, education, culture). The primary (4) non-state actor differs significantly across policies, exhibiting the greatest variance. In economic policies, employer groups dominate; in social policies, which have the longest list of non-state actors, parties, unions, and associations are central; in gender equality policy, NGOs and individuals play significant roles; in education, only part of the academic community is influential; media policy involves business interest groups, professional associations, and political parties; and cultural organizations are prominent in culture policy. The involvement of (5) international actors varies but the EU remains the most significant overall.

Regarding (6) Actors' relations, three policies exhibit hidden relationships, politicization (accompanied by clientelism in some cases), and subcontracting of NGOs. In contrast, reports on the other three policies merely gloss over the structure of relationships, criticizing personal connections. Descriptions of (7) policy goals vary: in two sectors experts emphasize the benefits to small or large groups, while in the others focus on the content of goals, some of which are single, some dual, or multiple (e.g., equality; stability of the market vs. media diversity; quality of life, identity, and development). Educational policy lacks a description of goals, suggesting considerable diversity in this aspect. (8) Policy instruments also show heterogeneity, encompassing regulation, public finances, services, the public sector, overall tax and budget levels, public enterprises, laws, information, education, and concessions. Further research should prioritize identifying the dominant or primary instruments in each sector. This could not be discerned from the reports as it was done for the code of non-state actors. However, the code of (2) stability/change is relatively uniform across all policies, with most undergoing change primarily due to pressure from the

international context, especially from the EU (except for cultural policy, which maintains a status quo).

While broader or more detailed data may be lacking for certain characteristics of Croatian policymaking, and while some features may characterize the entire political system rather than specific policies, the identified differences among policies suggest the existence of arenas of power. Lowi's foundational concept of arenas of power emphasizes the dynamic interaction between policy and politics. My analysis, albeit limited, demonstrates variations in (7) goals and (8) instruments (policy), on the one hand, and actors, especially (4) non-state actors, and their relationships (politics), on the other hand, across different policy sectors. Is there a discernible pattern in this variation? I aim to explore this question using Lowi's framework.

Table 3: Characteristics of Croatian public policies

	Characteristic	ECONOMIC POLICIES	SOCIAL POLICIES	EDUCATION	GENDER EQUALITY	MEDIA	CULTURE
1.	Distinctive characteristic	------	Political voluntarism	Reform	New	Technology	Diversity
2.	Stability / change	Change driven by economic factors	Change driven by international actors	Europeanization	Europeanization	Europeanization	Status quo
3.	State actors	Central bank	Constitutional court *Local units**￼*	Local units	Rich overall institutional design	**Regulatory agency Parliamentary committee**	Local units (big cities)
					DOMINANCE OF MINISTRY		
4.	Primary non-state actors	**Employer groups* and others**	**Political parties Pensioners associations Unions**	Parts of academic community	**NGOs Prominent individuals**	**Business interest groups** Professional association Political parties	Cultural organizations
5.	International actors	EU, WB, IMF, OECD	EU, WB, IMF	EU, WB, OECD	EU, Council of Europe, UN	EU, European Commission	Council of Europe
6.	Actors' relations	**Often hidden**	Come politicization *Some clientele*	Personal connections	Cooperation of state and NGOs by subcontracting	Secrecy Personal connections Some partisanship	Personal contact Subcontracting of NGOs
					NEGLECT OF PUBLIC INTEREST		
7.	Policy goals	**Partial interests**	**Interests of large groups**	---------	**Equality (human rights)**	**Stability of market** vs. *Media diversity*	Quality of life Identity Development (social and of cultural industry)
8.	Policy instruments	**Regulation Overall level of taxes and budget** Public enterprises	Public finance Some services Some regulation and agencies	Laws Public money	**Regulations Information and Education**	**Regulation Concessions** *Informing and persuasion* Some public finance	Public finances Cultural public sector
11.	Visibility			*NO DELIBERATION*			
	COINDICES WITH?	REGULATORY	REDISTRIBUTIVE	MIX	CONSTITUTIVE	REGULATORY	MIX
			DISTRIBUTIVE	DEVIANT		*CONSTITUTIVE*	DEVIANT

*All characteristics that match Lowi's policy type suggested in the lowest row are marked with **bold letters** (no deliberation count for economic and media policy).

** All characteristics of "minor" type suggested in the lowest row are marked with *italic letters.*

Lowi's concepts and Croatian public policies

To align Croatian policies with Lowi's types, a final row was added to Table 3, indicating which Croatian sector corresponds to which of Lowi's types. This alignment was determined using the criterion that a policy and a type overlap if they share more than half of their characteristics. Lowi's types were conceptualized as sets of characteristics (see Table 1), with 10 basic features extracted. The characteristics of classical adjectival policies (which is present within the sampled Croatian sectors) and the basic description of state function (which serves as the definition of the type's name) were not counted. Therefore, among the remaining eight features, a sector must have at least five to be classified as a certain type. It is important to note that data on two of Lowi's characteristics (pattern of politics and type of conflict) were completely absent from the expert reports on Croatian policymaking. Hence, the criterion for classifying a Croatian sector was that it fulfills 5 out of 6 characteristics to be associated with a specific Lowi's type.

This is the result of the overlap test: two "pure" cases, two strong cases with "minor" type (small concentration of characteristic of another type), which gives four overlaps, and two deviant cases. Economic policies coincide with the regulatory type (5 characteristics). Gender equality policy, as a newer identity policy, greatly coincides with the constitutive type (5 characteristics). Social policies strongly coincide with the redistributive type (5 characteristics) and have a small concentration of features of the distributive type (2 characteristics). Media policy fits with the regulatory type (6 characteristics) but has a minor type in constitutive (2 characteristics). Culture and education are mixed "all around" – they have characteristics of more than two types.

In the second step, I meticulously compared the features / codes within each row of Tables 1 and 3, scrutinizing their details one by one. Among the individual characteristics examined, the most notable overlap between empirical examples and Lowi's theory was observed in the domain of (4) dominant non-state actors. Here, Croatian policies exhibited significant variation, aligning closely with Lowi's theoretical framework. Primarily, social policies emerged as a focal point where political parties were consistently cited as influential. This sector boasted the highest number of actors, with political parties wielding substantial power, alongside prominent associations. Similarly, the gender equality policy showcased a robust participation of NGOs, reflecting the sector's alignment with the constituent arena. Economic actors played a pivotal role within economic policies and media policy, both regulatory in nature.

Notably, a significant overlap was also observed in the realm of (8) policy instruments. Across all sectors, a diverse mix of instruments was employed, highlighting the multifaceted approach to policymaking. Interestingly, social

policy stood out for its significant utilization of public funds—a distinctive characteristic underscoring its redistributive nature. Conversely, gender equality policy emphasized the importance of information-based instruments, reflecting its focus on advocacy and awareness. Additionally, media policy uniquely featured licensing (concessions) as a key instrument, highlighting its regulatory framework. Regulation emerged as a common thread binding regulatory and constitutive policies—namely, economic, media, and gender equality policies—underscoring their shared emphasis on regulatory mechanisms to achieve policy objectives.

Lower levels of overlap were observed in the code of (7) policy goals. One contributing factor is the somewhat nebulous nature of this element in the theoretical framework outlined in the paper. Additionally, the reports from Croatian policy experts offered limited insight into policy goals. Nevertheless, there are intriguing variations in goals that can be readily linked to Lowi's classification, especially the differing focus on small and large groups of beneficiaries. Furthermore, in the code of (6) actors' relationships, also gaps in data are present. However, there are discernible differences among sectors in terms of the reported relationships among actors, some of which align neatly with theoretical expectations. For instance, gender equality policy exhibits a pattern of NGO subcontracting, while media and economic policies hint at the secretive nature of certain relationships. In contrast, social policies emphasize politicization and domination by political elites, indicating ideological disputes. Lastly, the absence of (11) public deliberations, while not significantly varying across Croatian sectors, appears to align well with regulatory and distributive policies.

Other features such as (1) distinctive characteristics, (2) state actors, (4) international actors, (9) usage of analysis, and (10) style of decision-making do not directly correspond to theoretical concepts, much like the two theoretical features that did not manifest in the empirical material. The code (2) stability/change does not exhibit overlaps between the data and theoretical concept, possibly due to its vague nature and lack of internal structure. However, overall, it appears that in the Croatian context, as suggested by Lowi's policy classification, policy content and politics, and the links between them, do systematically vary according to arenas of power or policy types.

Conclusion

This paper aimed to assess the applicability of Theodore Lowi's policy classification theory to Croatian policymaking. The goal was to determine the extent to which this empirical theory of policymaking, developed in the context of the United States, maintains coherence and relevance when applied to the distinct context of Eastern Europe. The results of this investigation are somewhat ambiguous. It could be argued that having two deviant cases is too many, but also how having four cases that match is significant. It is important to note that some challenges in achieving better alignment arise from limitations in the empirical research, such as not broad enough sampling of cases and experts, the unsatisfactory richness of data for specific characteristics, and the lack of multiple data sources. Additionally, policymaking reality is inherently complex and messy, making clear-cut classifications difficult or even impossible. This is in accordance with the fundamental premise of the paper, which suggests that it is more purposeful to understand and utilize Lowi's concepts in a taxonomical form that accommodates mixed cases.

Several main conclusions arise from the analysis. First, the fundamental idea of how policy-politics interplay varies within a single country and could be used to classify policymaking seems fully valid. Sets of goals and instruments differ parallel to sets of non-state actors and their relations to state actors. This is obviously a crucial insight from Lowi that should be preserved in the future. Second, the biggest and clearest difference exists between redistributive and regulatory policy types, which represent arenas of power in economic and social policies. My research confirmed this distinction, as these two types seem well-established. However, even though constitutive policies were most often marked in the literature as not being at the same cognitive level, I would argue that perhaps distributive policies are mostly "outside" of the taxonomy. Lowi characterized distributive policies with clientelism and evaluated them as undemocratic (Lowi, 1972, p. 308). Therefore, if they represent enduring arrangements, distributive policies may become degenerative and pathological. Third, while many features of policymaking were extracted, both from theory and from the data, only four appear central for classification: goals, instruments, non-state actors, and relations among actors. Issues related to rationality in policymaking and the usage of analysis were not just unrecognized by the theory but also failed to discriminate among Croatian policies to serve as a foundation for classification. On the other hand, some theoretical features appear too general—primarily, the pattern of politics—making them a challenge to be directly detected in policymaking descriptions. Finally, fourth, all features are not sophisticated enough, lacking clear indicators for each of their variants per policy type. In particular, policy goals and relations among actors require much further development and refinement, as there is no clear

guidance on what the data should reveal and how to recognize variance of types in the empirical examples.

Therefore, the concluding evaluation of policy classification developed by Theodore Lowi in the middle of the past century is positive. Major ideas founding Lowi's concepts are valid, despite the passage of time and the "hostile" environment that was used for testing. Still, even after 70 years of four policy types being alive and applied, they still lack sophistication for systematic and precise application. A most important recommendation for the enhancement of Lowi's theory is upgrading it with a structured and elaborated methodological framework. Each characteristic should be segmented into one or several indicators that would directly link empirical observations and data to elements of policy types or arenas of power. As this is not an easy endeavor, it seems that hard work on Lowi's policy classification is yet to come.

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Appendix 1: Questionnaire

Which public policies do you primarily engage with in your research?*

A) Classical state sectors

  A1) Foreign policy
  A2) Security policy
  A3) Penal policy
  A4) Judicial policy
  A5) Public administration reform policy
  A6) Migration policy
  A7)_____

B) Economic policy

  B1) Macroeconomic policy
  B2) Tax policy
  B3) Competition policy
  B4) Employment policy
  B5) Investment policy
  B6) Business regulation policy
  B7) Financial regulation policy
  B8) Regional policy
  B9)_____

C) Social policy

  C1) Social welfare policy
  C2) Health policy
  C3) Education policy
  C4) Women's policy
  C5) Minority policy
  C6) Housing policy
  C7) Family policy
  C8)_____

D) Sectoral policy

  D1) Environmental policy
  D2) Media policy
  D3) Information society policy
  D4) Agricultural policy
  D5) Energy policy
  D6) Transport policy
  D7)_____

E) Other policies

  E1) Cultural policy
  E2) Sports policy
  E3)_____

*You can mark more than one answer if you are involved in multiple public policies. In that case, please provide separate answers for questions 2 and 3 for each public policy.

The following open-ended questions cover various phases of the policymaking in the sector your research is engaged in. Through basic questions marked with bold letters and a series of sub-questions, the phases of agenda setting, policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation of implementation results are elaborated. When answering, it is suggested to provide a summary or a series of bullet points. Complete answers should cover two basic questions, while sub-questions are designed to serve as a framework for thinking or as associations on possible elements of your answer. It is not necessary to include all sub-questions in the response. The length of the response depends entirely on you, but your detailed assessments and insights will be extremely useful.

(1) How is policy problem that you research put onto agenda and how are its alternative solutions shaped?

Why and how something becomes a political problem / issue of public concern?

How is determined what are the priorities and aims of the sector?

Who are main actors in agenda-setting?

Whose voice is heard the most?

Who is excluded from this process?

Whose problems are rarely on the agenda?

Which governmental body is most dominant in the process of priority determination, and which is not involved enough?

What's the scope of the impact of citizens, media, political parties, interest groups, think tanks and international actors?

How are proposals of laws or strategies prepared?

Is there any estimation of possible alternatives and its effects?

Which techniques and methods are used to determine the best solution?

Who proposes solutions?

Who is consulted in this process?

Is there any cooperation among governmental bodies and in which form?

Is the public participating in any form?

(2) How is the policy that you explore implemented and how are its results evaluated?

Who are the main implementers of programs, strategies and laws that serve as the policy framework?

What policy instruments are used (regulation, public services, public enterprises, taxation and public spending, market, information and persuasion...)?

What instruments are lacking for successful implementation?

With whom central public authorities cooperate in the implementation?

What are the main problems of implementation?

Does the policy achieve the expected results and impact on target groups?

Are there modifications of the regulatory frame during implementation and how?

Whose understanding of a policy is crucial in implementation phase?

Is the implementation process monitored?

Who reports on the implementation?

What is the quality of those reports?

By what criteria are most often policy results evaluated?

Who evaluates the results of policies?

Who is insufficiently involved in evaluation of the results?

For what purposes are results of evaluation used?

Appendix 2: Summaries of codes

ECONOMIC POLICIES

Characteristic of policymaking is… (*Code 3*)	Elements of the characteristic are… (**Description combined from several *Codes 2***)
CHANGE	Driven by disruption of economic balance, external shocks, structural problems, sometimes pressure of interest groups, and EU
STATE ACTORS	Dominance of ministry; Central bank; *Working groups for law proposals are regularly organized, but with low influence*
NON-STATE ACTORS	Pressure / interest groups – big and homogeneous (as pensioners' associations, unions, farmers, professional associations); Employer groups; Some consultants / scientists / interests groups have direct link to government and influence
WEAK NON-STATE ACTORS	Exclusion of small social groups, poorly organized and unrepresented (as sectors without unions, crafts, small entrepreneurs, workers in education culture and science, NGOs, etc.); media, citizens and think tanks – with low influence; political parties – after other actors
INTERNATIONAL ACTORS	EU; World Bank / international financial institutions; OECD
RELATIONS	Employers-government = hidden; Some representatives of interest groups in government
GOALS	Partial interest benefits; *Neglected citizens interests*
INSTRUMENTS	Regulation (prohibitions, guidelines, creation of strategies); taxes, budget; public enterprises
ANALYSIS	No analytical background of decisions, usage of scientific knowledge, systematic research; beginning of monitoring and evaluation but of low quality and because of the international actors; state actors do not recognize importance of analysis or data gathering
STYLE	Ad hoc, speedy, elemental, non-consistency, non-compatibility of measures, on intuition; low coordination among governmental bodies and too large discretions; low quality of policy communication with the public; no deliberation - public is not included, no expert deliberations