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CRIME AND DEVIANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF “LATE” MODERNITY AND GLOBALIZATION

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to present and analyse some contemporary sociological approaches to crime and deviance in the context of “late” modernity and globalization, as well as to emphasize some of the contemporary sociological debates about wider social, economic and cultural changes that have an impact not only on the ways we understand or think about crime and deviance, but on the forms and patterns of crime and deviance themselves. In this regard various new sociological theories of “high”, “late” or “reflexive” modernity and theories of globalization are developing among which the special emphasis is given on some theories that contribute to a better understanding of the role and the implications that the transition to “late” modernity and different dimensions of globalization have on crime and deviance such as the theory of “the exclusive society” (Young), “reflexive modernity” (Beck, Giddens), “revised theory of modernization” (Inglehart, Welzel), “*global criminal economy*” (Castells), “global criminal flows” (Ritzer) etc. Selected theories emphasize the following: first, the need to relate crime and deviance to major structural, economic and cultural changes in “late” modern societies, such as the different aspects of the “exclusion”, the rise of relative deprivation, the rise of individualism, diversity, difference, pluralism, “risk”, insecurity etc., and the second, the need to relate them with the complex processes of globalization, new technologies, mass consumerism, marketisation, inequality etc., in order to understand and propose some sociological explanations of the causes of the crime and deviance in the global age.

Key words: *crime, deviance, “late” modernity, “exclusive society”, globalization.*

Introduction

There is no generally accepted definition of social deviance among sociologists or criminologists, but in this paper we accept the broad definition of deviance (crime and juvenile delinquency as the most obvious forms) according to which “deviance consists of those acts that do not follow the norms and expectations of a particular social group”¹. Namely, social deviance is relative², and it can only be defined in relation to a particular culture and society, or in other words it is culturally and socially determined, while cultures as well as societies change and vary over time.

Although crime and deviance are primarily the subjects of criminology, sociology also has a long history of studying the causes of them. Therefore it is not surprising that the number of different sociological theories of deviance and crime is extensive, and thus they cannot all be presented or even mentioned in this paper. Moreover, it would be difficult to classify them all. Namely, we could talk about them from different historical phases of classicism, positivism, pluralism and radicalism³. Then, from different theoretical perspectives such as a functionalist, critical (neo-Marxist, radical, feminist approaches), interactionist, phenomenological, postmodernist etc.⁴ Furthermore, we could distinguish the major sociological theories of crime and criminal behavior, and the major sociological theories of deviance⁵.

Most of the theories about crime center on the explanation of statistical distribution of criminal behavior, crime patterns and crime rates, or focus on the characteristics of the specific deviant⁶. However, these are related but separated aspects and levels of analysis of crime. In short, the causes of crime and criminal

¹ Haralambos, M.; Holborn, M., *Sociology: Themes and Perspectives*, 8th ed., Collins, London, 2013, p. 347.

² The question of what is crime is also socially determined (through criminal justice system) but it is generally accepted that “social deviance is a far broader term than crime”, because the latter is restricted by law (Hall, S., *Social Deviance*, in: *Concise Encyclopaedia of Comparative Sociology*, Brill, Leiden, 2014, p. 1). But, the legalistic definitions of crime as a violation of the criminal law and definitions of criminals (those who violate criminal law) raises another questions because there are many people who “violate the law and are never arrested, prosecuted, or convicted” etc. (Borgatta, E. F.; Montgomery, R. J. V. *Encyclopedia of Sociology*, 2nd ed, Vol. 1, Macmillan Reference USA, New York, 2000, p. 534).

³ Hall, S., *op. cit.*, note 2.

⁴ Haralambos, M.; Holborn, M., *op. cit.*, note 1.

⁵ Borgatta, E. F.; Montgomery, R. J. V., *op. cit.*, note 2.

⁶ Furthermore, among different approaches or theories about the causes of criminal behavior (e.g. *biogenic-sociobiogenic*, *psychogenic* and *sociogenic*) we can emphasize sociological theories which consider that “criminal behavior is learned in a socialization process by individuals who are neither biologically nor psychologically flawed“ (*Ibid.*, p. 506).

behavior are multiple, complex and interconnected, and in order to understand them it is necessary to combine different theories about crime towards theoretical integration⁷. Below we will outline some issues regarding the major sociological theories of deviance.

According to Borgatta and Montgomery, we can distinguish *micro-level* and *macro-level* theories, as well as *social origin* theories that “focus on the causes of norm violations“, and *social reaction* theories that analyze deviance as “a matter of social construction“⁸. These enable a classification of the following four types of deviance theories. Theories of the *macro-level origins* of deviance explain deviant behavior by examining following aspects of social structure: first, poverty and economic inequality as the primary (but not the only) cause of deviant behavior; second, subcultures within the larger culture and society as the cause of deviant behavior for those sharing deviant beliefs and values; third, the level of social integration into the communities and neighborhoods⁹. In addition, *macro-level reaction* theories explain deviant behavior by analyzing the structure of economic and political power in society as a cause of deviance with primary concern in “explicating the linkages between inequality in society and inequality in the labeling and processing of deviants“¹⁰. Furthermore, the theories of the *micro-level origins* of deviance explain deviant behavior by examining its causes in the socialization or personal circumstances of the individual¹¹. Lastly, the *micro-level reaction* theories explain deviance “as a matter of definition” reasoning that “deviant behavior is rooted in the process by which persons define and label the behavior of others as deviant“¹².

Still, the causes of deviance are multiple and complex and in order to understand them it is necessary to combine different theories, as well as to develop new directions toward theoretical integration that “offers overarching models of deviant behavior that cut across classical theories, combining different levels of explanation and causal focuses“¹³.

However, this division of theories that we emphasized in the introductory part of the paper is useful for the understanding of the *macro level* analysis in this paper, as well as for understanding some aspects of *macro-level origin* theories that will be shortly presented in the following pages. Namely, various contemporary social changes have an impact on research of deviance and crime, but four general trends undoubtedly. According to Carrabine et al. these are: “the movement to a late modern

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 662-663.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 663-664.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 671.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 669.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 671.

society; the drift towards postmodernism; the speeding up of globalization; the emergence of a risk society”¹⁴. In this regard, the aim of this paper is to present and analyse some contemporary sociological approaches to crime and deviance in the context of the complex social processes of “late” modernity and globalization, as well as to emphasize some of the contemporary sociological debates about wider social, economic and cultural changes that have an impact not only on the ways we understand or think about crime and deviance, but on the forms and patterns of crime and deviance themselves¹⁵. Still, there is no need to emphasize that the sociological theories and approaches selected to be presented below in this paper cannot provide answers to the whole range of different questions about crime and deviance, but perhaps they can contribute to a better understanding of the causes of them in the particular context of “late” modernity and in the age of globalization.

1. Some of the causes of crime and deviance in the context of “late” modernity

In this part of the paper, we will present and analyse some contemporary sociological theories of modernity that contribute to a better understanding of the role and the implications that the transition to “late” modernity has on crime and deviance such as the theory of “the exclusive society” (Young), “reflexive modernity” (Beck, Giddens), and “revised theory of modernization” (Inglehart, Welzel). These theories, with the exception of Young’s theory, are not explicitly connected or addressed to the deviance and crime, but can contribute to relating crime and deviance to major structural, economic and cultural changes in “late” modern societies, such as the different aspects of the “exclusion”, the rise of relative deprivation, the rise of individualism, diversity, difference, pluralism, “risk”, insecurity etc.

Young explores and emphasizes different kinds of division and “exclusion” that are relevant for the understanding of the transition from modernity to late modernity, seen as “a movement from an inclusive society of stability and homogeneity” (society of the 1950s and 1960s), to “an exclusive society of change and division”¹⁶. That is, according to Young a movement “from a society whose accent was on assimilation and incorporation to one that separates and excludes”¹⁷. In the context of deviance, that is a movement from a society “which attempted to assimilate deviance and disorder” to one “which responds to deviance by separation and

¹⁴ Carrabine et al., *Criminology: A sociological introduction*, 2nd ed., Published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2008, p. 117.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Young, J., *The Exclusive Society: Social Exclusion, Crime and Difference in Late Modernity*, Sage Publications, London, 2007, p. vi.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

exclusion”¹⁸. Young indicates that in late modern world exclusion occurs on three levels: “economic exclusion from labour markets, social exclusion between people in civil society and the ever-expanding exclusionary activities of the criminal justice system and private security”¹⁹. Young concludes that we live in a time of massive structural changes, or in his words, in a time of fundamental changes in the labour markets (primary and secondary); structural unemployment²⁰; disintegration of communities; restructuring of patterns of leisure etc.²¹ And all these and other structural changes have been, according to Young accompanied by cultural changes that are no less dramatic²²: transformation of patterns of desire; spreading of globalization and mass media, redefinition of the old patterns of reward and effort²³ etc. In this regard, Young suggests that the wider structural and cultural changes must be analysed and related to the crime and deviance *analysis*, as well as to the debate about rules that “change from year to year”, and vary “between groups throughout society”²⁴. Furthermore, Young emphasizes that the “fundamental dynamic of exclusion is a result of market forces which exclude vast sections of the population from the primary labour market and of market values which help generate a climate of individualism”²⁵. Mentioned exclusions have an effect “both on the causes of crime (through relative deprivation and individualism) and on the reactions against crime (through economic precariousness and ontological insecurity)”²⁶. Furthermore, these exclusions and especially “insecurities of status and economic position” together with feelings of deprivation, produced widespread feeling of insecurity that according to Young can be seen “as a sense of vertigo”²⁷. Moreover, “vertigo is the malaise of late

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. vi.

²⁰ Although we may quarrel about following proportions, Young points out “the reduction of the primary labour market, the expansion of the secondary market and the creation of an underclass of structurally unemployed”, which Will Hutton (1995) described as the “40:30:30 society” (Young, J., *op. cit.*, note 16, p. 8). In other words, “forty percent of the population in tenured secure employment, 30% in insecure employment, 30% marginalized, idle or working for poverty wages” (*Ibid.*, p. 8).

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. vi.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ According to Young a good example of these changes are disapproving of poverty, and celebrating the success of celebrity, the invisibility of the working poor, hard work and success based on meritocratic principles, and the rise of celebrities and their lifestyle of the rich and famous, as a key transformations in late modernity (Young, J., *The Vertigo of Late Modernity*, Sage Publications, Los Angeles, 2007, p. 49).

²⁴ Young, J., *op. cit.*, note 16, p. vi.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

²⁷ Young, J., *op. cit.*, note 23, p. 12.

modernity; a sense of insecurity of insubstantiality, and of uncertainty, a whiff of chaos and a fear of falling”²⁸. The signs of this vertigo are everywhere in class structure, but Young stresses that it is particularly widespread among the middle classes²⁹.

Below we will outline this and some more issues related to changes in “late” modern societies, more precisely the discussion about the notion of society with emphasis on the question of integration, then the discussion about the “risk” society with emphasis on the changes and insecurities in work and employment, and lastly the discussion about the changes in values towards the rising of individualism.

Because deviance is culturally and socially determined, first we will open the question about the conception or notion of “culture“ and the conception or notion of “society“ in the period of “high“, “late“ or “reflexive“ modernity. Namely, traditional concepts or notions of “culture“ as a unique, homogeneous, closed, static, territorialized, national, etc. are abandoned in this period of “late” modernity and globalization, and culture is understood as a diverse, hybrid, heterogeneous, open, fluid, dynamic, deterritorialized, transnational, etc.³⁰ In a similar way, various sociological analyses of late modernity emphasize the need for abandoning the traditional concept or notion of society as “plainly *nation-states*” in explicating today’s societies³¹. More precisely, the idea of “methodological nationalism” as the idea “that the contours of society generally coincide with the contours of the nation-state”, or the idea that societies can be imagined as “territorial units“, is abandoning³². Furthermore, contemporary sociological theories of modernity are questioning the notion of society as a homogeneous, closed, static etc.³³, and the emphasis is now on the understanding of the heterogenization of the post-industrial societies, on multiplicity and pluralism of values, as well as on the rapidly changing social relations that, during the period of “reflexive“ modernity, or as the present consequences of modernity, go beyond national up to the international, transnational and global level. In this regard Giddens’s approach to modernity was determined by

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ Jeknić, R., Conceptual and Definitional Polysemy of the Term of Culture in Contemporary Social Sciences, *Balkan Social Science Review*, Vol. 6, 2016, pp. 137. – 155.

³¹ Giddens, A., *The Consequences of Modernity*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1990, p. 13.

³² Beck, U., *Što je globalizacija? Zablude globalizma – odgovori na globalizaciju*, Vizura, Zagreb, 2003, p. 53.

³³ Basic features of late modern community are plurality, fluidity and difference; fragmentation, crosscutting and hybridization; changes in subcultures (intensity and coherence); widespread relative deprivation (material and in terms of status) etc. (Young, J., *op. cit.*, note 23, p. 195).

the idea of “discontinuities“, particularly because “the modes of life brought into being by modernity have swept us away from all traditional types of social order“³⁴.

Closely connected with the notion of society, and specifically in regard to our topic are theoretical interpretations of classical sociological authors like Parsons on social systems and “problem of order“³⁵. Namely, the “problem of order” is central in his analyses of social systems “because it is defined as a question of integration-what holds the system together in the face of divisions of interest which would *set all against all*“³⁶. According to Giddens, it is no longer useful to think of social systems in terms of closed systems, and he suggests the reformulation of the question of order in a way that it must be seen “as one of *time-space distancing* - the conditions under which time and space are organized so as to connect presence and absence“³⁷. Similarly, according to Beck societies today imply “non-integration“³⁸. Therefore, thinking about societies include understanding the question of what connects but also divides individuals, diversity instead of assumed unity, similarities and differences, pluralism, fragmentation etc. In this regard, Touraine notes that it is important to talk about the fragmentation and disintegration in today’s societies because we must find a principle that can integrate this divided world and “stick together its pieces in order to speak again of modernity“³⁹. In sum, any attempt to find that new principle, as well as to understand the new notion of conformity and deviance, has to start from recognizing deep and complex changes in “late“ modern societies.

Further, Giddens points out that “modern societies (nation-states), in some respects at any rate, have a clearly defined *boundedness*“, but still “all such societies are also interwoven with ties and connections which crosscut the sociopolitical system of the state and the cultural order of the *nation*“⁴⁰. For example, according to Urry traditional notion of society is replaced with notion of “networks and flows“, or shorter, “social as society” transforms into the “social as mobility“⁴¹. In this regard, mobility is a new key word for understanding contemporary societies, and that includes examining “the diverse mobilities of peoples, objects, images, information and wastes” and social consequences as well as complex interdependencies between them⁴². Besides, that includes examining different flows of people and objects

³⁴ Giddens, A., *op. cit.*, note 31, p. 4.

³⁵ Giddens, A., *op. cit.*, note 31, pp. 13-14.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

³⁸ Beck, U., *op. cit.*, note 32, p. 27.

³⁹ Touraine, A., *Kritika modernosti*, Politička kultura, Zagreb, 2007, p. 177.

⁴⁰ Giddens, A., *op. cit.*, note 31, p. 14.

⁴¹ Urry, J., *Sociology beyond Societies: Mobilities for the twenty-first century*, Routledge, London, 2000, p. 2.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 1.

“within, but especially beyond, the territory of each society, and how these flows may relate to many different desires“ (e.g. work, leisure, criminal gain etc.)⁴³.

Second is the discussion about themes of security and risk in contemporary societies. According to Giddens, modernity is “double-edged phenomenon”⁴⁴ in that sense because modernity enabled the development of modern institutions with greater security and more opportunities for all of us, while on the other hand, under the conditions of modernity, great number of risks, dangers and different uncertainties are developing. In this regard, Giddens emphasizes that living in modernity means not only recognizing the existence of a risk but also accepting the fact that risks “cannot be eliminated”⁴⁵. In other words, living in “high” modernity means living “in an environment of chance and risk”⁴⁶. Moreover, Giddens outlines specific risk profile of modernity in following settings: 1. *globalization of risk* in the sense of *intensity* (e.g. nuclear war); 2. *globalization of risks* which affect everyone or at least large numbers of us (e.g. changes in the global division of labour); 3. risk stemming from the *created environment*; 4. the development of *institutionalized risk environments* affecting the life-chances of millions (e.g. investment markets); 5. *awareness of risk as risk* (e.g. risks cannot be converted into certainties by any knowledge); 6. *the well-distributed awareness of risk* and dangers; 7. *awareness of the limitations of expertise* (e.g. expert system can’t predict all the consequences)⁴⁷.

In this regard, Giddens analyses risk as been globalized, but he also analyses consequences of the perception of risk on the level of self-identity in “high” modernity. More precisely, Giddens considers that reflexivity about risks is important in development of self-identity because we are living “in a secular risk culture”, emphasizing that “awareness of high-consequence risks is probably for most people a source of unspecific anxieties“, influencing not only on perception of greater insecurities and tensions on day to day life and behavior, thus longer, in terms of reducing life-planning⁴⁸. Besides, living in the high modernity involves various other changes on the level of self-identity, as well as on the questions like “what is acceptable/ appropriate/ recommended behavior”⁴⁹. For example, Giddens highlights that “the self in modern society is frail, brittle, fractured, fragmented“, and people are giving up hope that the wider social environment can be controlled, so they “retreat to purely personal preoccupations: to psychic and bodily self-improvement”⁵⁰. That

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁴⁴ Giddens, A., *op. cit.*, note 31, p. 7.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

⁴⁶ Giddens, A., *Modernity and Self-Identity*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1997, p. 109.

⁴⁷ Giddens, A., *op. cit.*, note 31, pp. 124-125.

⁴⁸ Giddens, A., *op. cit.*, note 46, pp. 181-182.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 134.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 169-171.

again influences on “the creation of morally justifiable forms of life that will promote self-actualization in the context of global interdependence”⁵¹, and on the creation of a variety lifestyle options with narcissist “self and body“ goals in the focus⁵². This will again be discussed in the following part of this paper, and below we will extract some parts of Beck’s analyses of “risk” society.

According to Beck, the process of reflexive modernization of postindustrial society begins with the new paradigm called “*risk society*“, emphasizing creating “a *different* society, a *different* modern who is not in any sense of the word any better, but it’s *just* different”⁵³. Similarly to Giddens, according to Beck, *risk* may also be defined “as a *systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself*”⁵⁴. In this regard, Beck concludes that traditional understanding of “national society” corresponds to the first modernity, while the second modernity corresponds to “world society”, more clearly, the “world risk society”⁵⁵. In such a society everything is reconsidered and questioned, and everybody discusses on “something that is not the case, but it could happen” in an unknown and uncertain future⁵⁶. This is how a “risk dramaturgy” is created expanding fear of the future, anxiety, frightening and reflection in the “what if” and similar categories⁵⁷. Such an unfamiliar world of the other modernity, as well as the dominant neoliberal discourse of globalization, spreads “not only the fear and trembling, but also politically paralyzes”, because “nothing can be done” or be changed anyway⁵⁸. Thus, for example, the causes of drug addiction, alcoholism and other addictions, a state of drift and various other forms of deviance and delinquent behavior can be understood as individual responses on different insecurities of everyday life in such “risk” societies.

Following important structural feature of the Beck’s *world risk society* is the expansion of “capitalism without employment”, or capitalism that has “abolished the labour” because “unemployment is no longer a marginal destiny, it potentially affects everyone”⁵⁹. Namely, post-industrial countries seek to solve this by various *flexible paying jobs and flexible and unsecure employment, but it only hides the problem. In reality, “everything is growing: unemployment and new joblessness, unsecured*

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 215.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 225.

⁵³ Beck, U., *Pronalaženje političkoga: prilog teoriji refleksivne modernizacije*, Naklada Jesenski i Turk, Zagreb, 2001, p. 75.

⁵⁴ Beck, U., *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*, Sage Publications, London, 1992, p. 21.

⁵⁵ Beck, U., *op. cit.*, note 32.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 237.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 281.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 288.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

employment relationships and still quiet reserve army of labour”⁶⁰. In this sense, according to Beck, we are witnessing “no longer a redistribution of jobs, but a redistribution of unemployment”⁶¹, while economic growth no longer leads to the “reduction of unemployment”, but rather to the “reduction of jobs – *jobless growth*”⁶². Therefore, rapid transformations of work, insecurities of the work “flexibility”, the raising of unemployment and individualization of work have affected on the widening of economic inequalities, relative deprivation and social exclusion (on the level of most, not all contemporary societies, as well as on the global level)⁶³.

In this regard, how can we analyze previously mentioned social integration in such essentially exclusive societies? We could only emphasize Touraine’s conclusion that in such societies, “integration cannot be achieved by introducing stricter rules and greater conformism”⁶⁴. Namely, according to Touraine, integration of all (not only for some groups) “presupposes both, that they have jobs, or in other words an organized social activity, and that they can assert their cultural and social identity”⁶⁵. Furthermore, Young points out that “whereas inclusion once meant lifetime stabilities of work, family and locality embedded in a culture of homogeneity”, today must include “the creation of narratives which can cope with instabilities of biography and the problems of identity in a diverse society”⁶⁶. Lastly, there is no need to especially emphasize that the restructuring of the labour market and the new insecurity of employment can lead to “looking for alternative ways of survival”, and that “crime may be one of these” ways⁶⁷.

The next important cultural change in “late” modern societies relates to deep changes in values. Namely, according to “revised theory of modernization” by Inglehart and Welzel, socio-economic development directs a cultural shift towards more expressive values⁶⁸ (e.g. towards civil and political freedoms, equality of genders, self-actualization, quality of life etc.), that include rising individualism and

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 144.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 146.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 151.

⁶³ Castells, M., *Uspon umreženog društva*, Golden marketing, Zagreb, 2000; Beck, U., *op. cit.*, note 54; Beck, U., *op. cit.*, note 32; Young, J., *op. cit.*, note 16; Young, J., *op. cit.*, note 23.

⁶⁴ Touraine, A., *Can we live together? Equality and difference*. Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2000, p. 263.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 263.

⁶⁶ Young, J., *op. cit.*, note 23, p. 212.

⁶⁷ Carrabine et al., *op. cit.*, note 14, p. 118.

⁶⁸ There are two dimensions of values: “one includes a polarization between *traditional values* and *secular-rational values*, and another includes a polarization between *survival values* and *expressive values*” (Inglehart, R.; Welzel, C., *Modernizacija, kulturna promjena i demokracija. Slijed ljudskog razvitka*, Politička kultura, Zagreb, 2007, p. 21).

autonomy, and an increasing emphasis on autonomous choices. According to Inglehart and Welzel, those are not static categories and they are changing depending on the “direction of socio-economic development” leading to increased autonomy and individualism⁶⁹. Although there is a “widespread fear that expressive values are inherently egocentric and that they destroy the bonds of communion”, this shift towards more expressive values doesn’t mean that “everything will be tolerated“, it means that “life in the community becomes a reflection of the autonomous choices of people”⁷⁰. Still, the rising trend of individualization which is associated with growing emphasis on expressive values, in the following part of this paper will be connected with the neoliberal capitalist globalization that promotes the culture-ideology of consumerism⁷¹.

2. Crime and deviance in the context of globalization

Globalization is a very broad term, and the relationship between globalization and crime and deviance is multiple and complex. Still, most of the issues that have been highlighted in the previous part of the paper⁷², also apply on the global level (from the new notion of societies, globalization of risks, global transformations of work and employment, rising relative deprivation, widening of inequalities etc.). Therefore, in this part of the paper, we will present some contemporary sociological theories of globalization that can contribute to a better understanding of the role and the implications that the different dimensions of globalization have on crime and deviance emphasizing only two major themes, firstly the impact of the cultural dimension of globalization on the rising of consumerism, and then theories of globalization of crime with emphasis on the theory of “*global criminal economy*” (Castells), and “global criminal flows” (Ritzer).

Firstly we will indicate the impact of the cultural dimension of globalization on different lifestyle options and values. In this regard, Giddens analyses different connections between lifestyle options (with narcissist *self and body* goals in the focus) and globalizing influences, but we will extract the influence of the consumer capitalism “with its efforts to standardize consumption and to shape tastes through advertising“, in furthering narcissism⁷³. Namely that is very simple, the consumption

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 282.

⁷¹ Transnational practices “take place in three main spheres: 1. the economic; 2. the political; 3. the cultural-ideological”, corresponding to the practices of “1. the transnational corporation; 2. the transnational capitalist class; 3. the culture-ideology of consumerism” (Sklair, in: Haralambos, M.; Holborn, M., *op. cit.*, note 1, p. 609).

⁷² Simply, reflexive “modernity is inherently globalising“ (Giddens, A., *op. cit.*, note 31, p. 63).

⁷³ Giddens, A., *op. cit.*, note 46, p. 225.

of the “right“ kinds of commodities and services needs money for buying that goods⁷⁴, while the consumption is presented as the solution for achieving “the very things the narcissist desires - attractiveness, beauty and personal popularity“⁷⁵. At this level of analysis, it can only be assumed that some of the causes of criminal offences against property could be related with influences of the consumer capitalism and with the increased desire for consumption of the commodities that are widespread by mass media and with the culture-ideology of consumerist individualism, but simply not legally available to all⁷⁶. In such a way a new form of social inequality and exclusion is creating in the consumer societies, exclusion from consumerism that could be seen as a potent source of deviance⁷⁷. Still, widespreadness of the culture-ideology of consumerism is of course not accidental, and one of the consequences of neoliberal globalization is the concentration of power in the hands of a “consumerist fraction” within the global transnational capitalist class (TCC)⁷⁸. Therefore, merchants and mass media very easily and effectively indoctrinate consumers with the ideology of the transnational corporations. In this regard, we can also outline an interesting theory of Bard and Soderqvist, that analyse the current transition, or the last paradigm shift from *capitalism* to “*informationalism*“ and its consequences to class divisions⁷⁹. Namely, in the information age, the societies are divided between “the netocracy“ (as the new ruling class that exploits), and “the consumtariat“ or “the consumer proletariat“ (as the new lower class or new proletariat)⁸⁰. In doing so, the crucial characteristic of the “the consumtariat” is the “consumption according to the

⁷⁴ According to Thomas, the driving force of our behavior are desires, “which reduced to the ultimate goal represent social values” and “money is the most general value”, because it easily changes to different values, which are used for realization of our desires (Thomas, in: **Tudor-Šilović, N., Thomasova studija o prostituciji – obrazac primjene kvalitetnih metoda na temelju dobro razradene teorije, Revija za sociologiju, Vol. 3, No. 3-4, 1973, p. 99**). However, “there are many ways of getting money: it can be done, by working, saving, lending, begging, stealing, falsifying, gambling, smuggling, etc.”, and this choice of the ways one is willing to do in order to get the money, that questioning and making a decision, Thomas names “the defining of the situation” (*Ibid.*, p. 100).

⁷⁵ Giddens, A., *op. cit.*, note 46, p. 172.

⁷⁶ For example, this can be connected with “an escalation in credit card use, with a potential increase in fraud” etc. (Carrabine et al., *op. cit.*, note 14, p. 117).

⁷⁷ Young, J., *op. cit.*, note 16.

⁷⁸ In Sklair’s analyses, TCC is the most powerful in the global system, and it is composed of four main, interlocking groups: the corporate fraction; the state fraction; the technical fraction, the consumerist fraction (merchants and media) (Sklair, L., Democracy and the Transnational Capitalist Class, *The Annals of the American Academy, AAPSS*, 581, 2002, p. 145).

⁷⁹ Bard, A.; Soderqvist, J., *Netokracija: nova elita moći i život poslije kapitalizma*, Differo, Zagreb, 2003.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

commandments given to them by the superior class”⁸¹. On this track, the contemporary neoliberal emphasis is on us as consumers, not as citizens, in the societies that are increasingly beginning to resemble a market, or shorter in a societies changing towards marketisation⁸².

Secondly, we will outline some theories about the globalization of crime. According to Castells, economic globalization and the new communication and transportation technologies enabled the development of the “global criminal economy”⁸³. In this regard, crime has always existed across cultures (e.g. piracy, terrorism, espionage etc.)⁸⁴, but the increasing interconnectedness of global crime, “the networking of powerful criminal organizations, and their associates, in shared activities throughout the planet, is a new phenomenon”, that profoundly affects national and international economies, politics, the question of security in societies etc.⁸⁵ Moreover, criminal organizations operate trans-nationally although organized crime and criminal organizations rooted and based in particular society and culture do not disappear in these global networks⁸⁶. Furthermore, their global networking allows those “criminal organizations to survive, and prosper, by escaping the controls of a given state at a difficult time”⁸⁷. In this regard, the criminal economy has expanded to a whole range of different activities “making it an increasingly diversified, and interconnected, global industry”⁸⁸. Therefore the following list of the seven global, major contemporary organized crime forms and activities is identified⁸⁹: drugs trafficking, weapons trafficking, trafficking of nuclear materials, smuggling of illegal immigrants, trafficking in women and children, trafficking in body parts, and money laundering.

Furthermore, according to Ritzer, crime can be analyzed as “negative global flow”, and he points out that “the sheer quantity of global, or cross-border crime has increased” in the context of globalization⁹⁰. In this regard, Ritzer emphasizes the impact of globalization “in changes in extant forms of crime (e.g. terrorism) and in the development of new forms of crime (cyber-crime)”⁹¹. Moreover, crime circulate

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

⁸² Haralambos, M.; Holborn, M., *op. cit.*, note 1; Touraine, A., *op. cit.*, note 39; Young, J., *op. cit.*, note 16.

⁸³ Castells, M., *Kraj tisućljeća*, Golden marketing, Zagreb, 2003.

⁸⁴ Carrabine et al., *op. cit.*, note 14.

⁸⁵ Castells, M., *op. cit.*, note 83, pp. 169-170.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 173.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 177.

⁸⁹ That list was made at “The 1994 United Nations Conference on Transnational Crime” (Castells, M., *op. cit.*, note 83, pp. 177-181; Carrabine et al., *op. cit.*, note 14, p. 126).

⁹⁰ Ritzer, G., *Globalization: a basic text*, Wiley-Blackwell, Maiden, MA, 2010, p. 377.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 377.

and flows across the globe and that include “flows of all sorts - drugs, money, human victims” (e.g. prostitutes), human perpetrators (e.g. terrorists), as well as “the various illegal sorts of things that flow through the worldwide web (e.g. child pornography, laundered funds etc.)”⁹². Furthermore, the development of new technologies, especially the Internet made “some criminal flows more successful” and “a number of illegal flows much easier” (e.g. of pornography, Internet scams)⁹³. Particularly, global criminal flows involve “people and organizations that may be legal, illegal, legal but operating illegally, or even be illegal and operating legally“, and that is crucial because “the line between that which is legal and illegal is very unclear”⁹⁴.

Concluding remarks

Avoiding pretentious conclusions on such a wide topic such as this, below we will indicate and summarize only some of the concluding remarks.

Undoubtedly, the causes of deviance are multiple and complex and in order to understand them it is necessary to combine different theories, different levels of analysis, explanation and causal focuses, as well as to develop new directions toward “theoretical integration”⁹⁵. For example, theories and empirical studies of legal socialization (referring to the processes through which members of a society acquire its legal and moral values such as fairness, justice, equality, norms and rules of behaviour etc.) as a form of social learning theories are example of the micro-level origins theories of deviance and are very important for understanding the impact of “late” modern values on juvenile and other delinquency⁹⁶. Still, those theories and studies are also very important for understanding legal socialization as a process that lasts for a lifetime, reflecting the cultural changes in “late” modern societies and what we all, or most of us, consider or not consider morally and legally justified behaviour in the frequently changing societies⁹⁷.

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 377.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 377.

⁹⁴ For example, “while drugs (e.g. cocaine) are clearly illegal, pharmaceuticals (e.g. Valium) are not“, and may be globally traded (*Ibid.*, p. 381).

⁹⁵ Borgatta, E. F.; Montgomery, R. J. V., *op. cit.*, note 2.

⁹⁶ Cohn, E. S., White, S. O., *Legal Socialization: A Study of Norms and Rules*, Springer-Verlag, New York, 1990.

⁹⁷ Cohn and White have analyzed various legal values (e.g. lawfulness, justifiable behaviours, rights, excluded groups, liberty etc.), and different social beliefs among which we single out individualism, and their conclusion that in the context of legal values, “preference for individual claims over the interests of the community fits conceptually with the abstraction of the individual from social characteristics and the universalism inherent in the legal concepts

Furthermore, deviance is culturally and socially determined, but in the heterogeneous and multicultural societies of “late” modernity it is difficult to expect a value consensus and make a judgment or question someone’s behavior, because “members of the society cannot be sure how closely other people share their values”⁹⁸. In other words, “the more heterogeneous the culture and the more swiftly its norms are changing, the less consensus about right and wrong exists within the society”⁹⁹. Namely, socio-cultural value pluralism of today’s societies means “that it is difficult to identify behavior that everyone considers deviant”, while crime is clearer in that sense¹⁰⁰. Still, according to Carrabine et al., late modernity brought with it “new freedoms, new levels of consumption and new possibilities for individual choices”, but it also brought with it new disorders and above all “new levels of crime and insecurity”, for there has been an increase in the overall crime rate and different patterns of crime in all parts of the world¹⁰¹.

Lastly, we would like to relate the topic of this paper with some of the conclusions from the “Manifeste pour les sciences sociales”. According to Calhoun and Wieviorka, the authors of this “Manifeste”, the “new intellectual space” of social sciences is globalization, on the one side, and the rising individualism, in all its dimensions, on the other side, both determining the way in which social analyses must develop¹⁰². In this regard, as we have aimed to present in this paper, the issue of deviance and crime is no exception. Nevertheless, at the end of this paper we want to highlight the Young’s conclusion that we live in a period of the idealization of individualism, choices, spontaneity, self-realization, recognition, mass consumerism etc., while the paradox of the late modernity is that “the building blocks for such a personal narrative are increasingly insubstantial: they are no longer embedded in a taken-for-granted world of continuity and certainty”¹⁰³. By this “building blocks”, Young means “community, work, the family – all the major institutions of social order” that have faced a transformation and become uncertain¹⁰⁴. Thus, according to Young late modernity produces “ontological insecurity – precariousness of being”¹⁰⁵ which is also an inescapable aspect of the contemporary analysis of crime and deviance.

of liberal democracy” (Cohn, E. S., White, S. O., Legal socialization effects on democratization, *International Social Science Journal*, 49: 152, 1997, p. 156).

⁹⁸ Borgatta, E. F.; Montgomery, R. J. V., *op. cit.*, note 2, p. 523.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 527.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ Carrabine et al., *op. cit.*, note 14, p. 118.

¹⁰² Calhoun, C.; Wieviorka, M., *Manifest za društvene znanosti: s komentarima Edgara Morina i Alaina Tourainea*, TIM press, Zagreb, 2017, p. 21.

¹⁰³ Young, J., *op. cit.*, note 23, p. 209.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 213.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

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