EMU'S GOVERNANCE POST-CRISIS: WHAT ROLE FOR INTERGOVERNMENTALISM?

Abstract

Over the years EU member states favored an intergovernmental approach to policy-making within the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). This approach emphasized the role played by national authorities, as member states' representatives, within a “soft governance” framework. In this framework, national representatives voluntarily participated in various coordinative networks and committees, which relied on interstate negotiations to create policies. However, the Euro area crisis highlighted the shortcomings of the intergovernmental approach to policy-making, such as divergent implementation of policies and regulatory arbitrage, which undermined the EMU’s stability. After the crisis, we are witnessing a centralization of policy creation processes and decision-making within the EMU, with apparently limited room for “old intergovernmentalism”. New actors such as the European Supervisory Authorities, perfectly embody this development since they require from member states to commonly agree “under the shadow” of non-majoritarian institutions, at times even against their own policy preferences. This raises important questions on the role of “old” conceptual frameworks in explaining current EU integration. Therefore, this paper explores the concept of intergovernmentalism (and also, “liberal intergovernmentalism”) as one the key driving forces within EMU’s governance, offering further insight into raised questions as well as arguing in favor of its political and integrationist potential in the years to come.