THE EUROGROUP: REFLECTIONS ON LEGITIMACY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Abstract

The Euro area sovereign debt crisis provoked transformative effects

within the governance of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU),

introducing new modes of policy-making as well as new stakeholders

within the governance structure, among which the Eurogroup. Although

an “informal body” that gathers high-level, national representatives in

deliberations related to wider economic matters within the Euro area, the

Eurogroup quickly established itself as a key influencer of the policy

agenda of the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (Ecofin). The

Eurogroup's prominent role within EMU policy-making has attracted

scholarly attention, with some noting that the body's role in decisionmaking

is “under-theorised” (Craig 2017, p. 234), which in turn raises

important concerns in regards of the Eurogroup's accountability and

legitimacy. Against this background the paper examines the Eurogroup's

legitimacy and (political) accountability, by outlining (or mapping)

theoretical and legal basis thereof, especially in the perspective of EMU's

growing democratic deficit.