• Stevan Gaber
  • Ilija Gruevski


This research allows additional ‘‘dynamic’‘ considerations in the voting process that will be added to the ‘‘static’‘ interpretation of the model of average voter and hypothesis of Tiebout. It concluded that the changes in the composition of voters will affect the profile of the average voter that will in turn have the effect on the ‘‘demand’‘ for public goods, resulting from the creation of ‘‘new’‘ average voter. This means that: 1) individuals, seeking to maximize their preferences, will adapt their behavior to the applied governmental policies; and 2) legislators and public officials, seeking to maximize their political profits, will meet the demand generated by the ‘‘dynamic’‘ average voter. A key element of the model of public choice is the recognition of the existence of a circular causal link created by the decisions of the average voter with government policies. This implies that changes in government policies are endogenous to the system and are created with the implementation of the policies themselves.



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How to Cite
Gaber, S., & Gruevski, I. (2018). ECONOMIC THEORIES OF PUBLIC CHOICE. Yearbook - Faculty of Economics, 10(1), 49-60. Retrieved from

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