ECONOMICS OF NETWORKS AS APPLIED TO SOCIAL CHOICE  MODEL OF LEVEL OF EDUCATION, SOCIAL DISTANCE, NEWS  VERACITY AND PROSPECT THEORY AND A NOTE ON WARDROP  EQUILIBRIUM AND BRAESS PARADOX

Dushko Josheski; Aneta Ristoska-Jankuloska; Aleksandra Zhezhova

doi:10.46763/YFNTS2471014j

Dushko Josheski Faculty of tourism and business logistics, Goce Delcev University, Stip, R.N. Macedonia
Aneta Ristoska-Jankuloska Faculty of Economics, University St Kliment Ohridski - Bitola, N. Macedonia
Aleksandra Zhezhova Faculty of tourism and business logistics, Goce Delcev University, Stip, R.N. Macedonia

DOI: https://doi.org/10.46763/YFNTS2471014j

Abstract

This paper investigates Barabási–Albert (BA) and Erdős-Rényi model and preferential attachment in different settings: social choice and social distance, news veracity and networks, Prospect theory with social choice, and Wardrop equilibrium with Braess paradox. News veracity is higher in Erdős-Rényi graph vs Barabási–Albert (BA), in the Erdős-Rényi graph spread of misinformation is higher than in the model with hubs (influential nodes). In the average social distance and education level model there
is higher news veracity between most educated individuals (PhD’s) more when two nodes have less than highest education. Probability of news being true (news veracity) is lowest for PhD’s but gaslighting (probability of perception of being gaslighted) is highest. With a degree centrality included nodes (individuals) with lower level of education perceive higher new veracity. Price of Anarchy (PoA) is higher in Erdős-Rényi (ER) versus Barabási–Albert graph. With Prospect theory in news veracity network gain and loss lines are further way on the left from reference point, with a letter being more to left. Congestion in the market for news makes more and more agents further away from equilibrium state.